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I. INTRODUCTION
Disparate impact analysis is an important feature on the horizon
of antidiscrimination law. The analysis has been codified in Title VII
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of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,' in which it plays a central role and
has been most developed. But it also plays a significant role across
virtually the entire spectrum of antidiscrimination law,2 both in this
country and abroad.3 Despite its importance, disparate impact
analysis has always been controversial' and nebulous,' in part
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, § 703(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (Supp. V
1993).
2. In addition to its application to employment discrimination under Title VII, the
model plays an important role under other statutes prohibiting employment discrimination
and in a number of other substantive areas, such as housing discrimination, credit
discrimination, and voting rights. See, e.g., Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,63-74 (1986)
(applying a type of disparate impact analysis in voting rights context); Abbott v. Federal
Forge, Inc. 912 F.2d 867, 872 (6th Cir. 1990) (applying disparate impact model under
federal age discrimination statute); Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington,
844 F.2d 926, 937-38 (2d Cir.) (applying disparate impact model in housing discrimination
case), affd per curiam, 488 U.S. 15 (1988) ; Montana Rail Link v. Byard, 860 P.2d 121,
130-31 (Mont. 1993) (applying disparate impact model under state law prohibiting
employment discrimination); Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending, 59 Fed. Reg.
18,266 (1994) (mandating that disparate impact model be applied in lending discrimination
cases).
3. A number of foreign jurisdictions have recognized the disparate impact model as
a method of proving discrimination. See, e.g., Sex Discrimination Act, No. 4, § 5(2) (1984)
(Austi.); Race Relations Act, 1976, ch. 74, § 1(1)(b) (U.K.); Sex Discrimination Act, 1975,
ch. 65, §§ 1(1)(b), 3(1)(b) (U.K.); Syndicat de l-Enseignement de Champlain v.
Commission Scolaire Regionale de Chambly, 115 D.L.R.4th 609 (1994) (Can.); Case
170/84, Bilka-Kaufhaus v. Weber von Hartz, 1986 E.C.R. 1607 (E.C.).
4. The controversy was especially heated during the Reagan administration because
of its view that Title VII embraced only the disparate treatment model of discrimination.
For a scholarly exchange on this view, see Joel L. Selig, The Reagan Justice Department
and Civil Rights: What Went Wrong, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 785; William Bradford
Reynolds, The Reagan Administration and Civil Rights: Winning the War Against
Discrimination, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 1001; Joel L. Selig, The Reagan Justice Department
and Civil Rights: Professor Selig Responds to Assistant Attorney General Reynolds, 1987
U. ILL. L. REV. 431. See also Drew S. Days, III, The Courts' Response to the Reagan Civil
Rights Agenda, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1003,1008-15 (1989) (noting judicial setbacks to Reagan
Justice Department's attempts to refocus civil rights enforcement on intentional
discrimination); Drew S. Days, I, Turning Back the Clock- The Reagan Administration
and Civil Rights, 19 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 309, 323-25 (1984) (criticizing the Reagan
Justice Department for initiating school desegregation litigation only when there was clear
evidence of "pervasive intentional discrimination"). For criticisms of the model
independent of the Reagan administration's approach, see Michael Evan Gold, Griggs'
Folly: An Essay on the Theory, Problems, and Origin of the Adverse Impact Definition of
Employment Discrimination and a Recommendation for Reform, 7 INDUS. REL. L.J. 429
(1985); Earl M. Maltz, The Expansion of the Role of the Effects Test in Antidiscrimination
Law: A Critical Analysis, 59 NEB. L. REV. 345 (1980).
5. The courts have struggled in their attempts to present a clear vision of the scope
and application of the model. They have had considerable difficulty, for example, in
defining the class of cases to which the model applies. See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 991 (1988) (concluding that the model applies to subjective
employment criteria); American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 723 (7th Cir. 1986)
(indicating in dicta that the model does not apply to sex-based wage claims). Considerable
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because of the lack of consensus on its underlying theoretical
justification.6 In this Article, we deconstruct 7 the disparate impact
model by examining it through two new lenses-concurrence and
stratification.8 This deconstruction permits us to see the disparate
impact model anew, to identify its features more clearly, and to
explore again, more fruitfully, its appropriate function in the
constellation of antidiscrimination models.9
uncertainty persists, even after Supreme Court decisions and legislative action, about the
precise constraints placed on the model by the requirement that plaintiffs identify a
particular employment practice. See infra notes 173-80 and accompanying text. Even
when the courts are clear that the model applies to a class of cases, they have faced
considerable difficulty defining the appropriate statistical comparisons. See, e.g., Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650 (1989) (holding that comparison must be
made based on qualified population in relevant labor market); Connecticut v. Teal, 457
U.S. 440, 442 (1982) (holding that "bottom line" statistics cannot be used defensively).
The courts' fuzzy vision of the disparate impact model is especially apparent when they
are unable to distinguish disparate impact and systemic disparate treatment cases. See
RAMONA L. PAETZOLD & STEVEN L. WILLBORN, THE STATISTICS OF DISCRIMINATION
§ 8.06 (1994) (describing how housing discrimination cases regularly mislabel systemic
disparate treatment cases as disparate impact cases).
6. Commentators have made a number of attempts to provide a theoretical
justification for the disparate impact model. See, e.g., Paulette M. Caldwell, Reaffirming
the Disproportionate Effects Standard of Liability in Title VII Litigation, 46 U. PiTr. L.
REv. 555,580-83 (1985) (arguing that disparate impact was designed to enhance productive
efficiency); Martha Chamallas, Evolving Conceptions of Equality Under Title VII:
Disparate Impact Theory and the Demise of the Bottom Line Principle, 31 UCLA L. REV.
305 (1983) (arguing that disparate impact was designed to produce equal outcomes for
disadvantaged groups); Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L.
REV. 235, 237-40 (1971) (arguing that disparate impact is the functional equivalent of
intentional discrimination); Michael J. Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial
Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 540, 555-59 (1977) (arguing that disparate impact is
designed to prevent the perpetuation of past discrimination); George Rutherglen, Disparate
Impact Under Title VII. An Objective Theory of Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297,
1308-11 (1987) (arguing that disparate impact is designed to prevent disparate treatment
in situations where pretextual discrimination is difficult to prove); see also Paul N. Cox,
Substance and Process in Employment Discrimination Law: One View of the Swamp, 18
VAL. U. L. REV. 21 (1983) (stating that efforts to provide a theoretical justification for the
disparate impact model "are in a state of near complete disarray").
7. We do not use the word "deconstruct" in the postmodern, Derridean sense. See
JACQUES DERRIDA, ACTS OF LITERATURE (1992); JACQUES DERRIDA, DE LA
GRAMMATOLOGIE (1992); CHRISTOPHER NORRIS, WHAT Is DECONSTRUCTION? (1988).
Instead, we re-examine the disparate impact model by applying new lenses in order to
uncover its key features. We then use the key features in conjunction with the lenses to
prescribe how the model should handle more complex factual situations that may arise.
8. A discussion of the meaning of these two terms appears immediately below, see
infra notes 12-16 and accompanying text, and more fully later, see infra part I.
9. Although some uncertainty exists about the precise boundaries between them, the
other major models of discrimination are individual disparate treatment, systemic disparate
treatment, reasonable accommodation, and harassment. See, e.g., PAETZOLD &
WILLBORN, supra note 5, §§ 1.01-1.12.
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Our deconstruction focuses on the causation element of the
disparate impact model. To establish a prima facie case of disparate
impact, the plaintiff must demonstrate that an employer "uses a
particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."'1 The model
is clear on how causation is established in the simplest case: When an
employer uses a single employment practice and applies it to a
homogeneous population, a plaintiff can prove that the practice
"causes" a disparate impact based on race by demonstrating that it
eliminates from consideration a higher proportion of black applicants
than white applicants." But our interest in the causation element
(and in the disparate impact model more generally) arose when we
began to reflect on slightly more complex situations.
First, we considered situations in which the employer uses two
employment practices to screen applicants-say, a test and a high
school diploma requirement. A number of interesting permutations
are possible from this slight increase in complexity. It is possible, for
example, that neither the test nor the high school diploma re-
quirement causes a disparate impact by itself, but that the two
practices operating together do. 2 Has the plaintiff established a
prima facie case if she proves this, or has she failed to show that a
10. Title VII, § 703(k)(1)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. V 1993)
(emphasis added). This language (and other language codifying and modifying the
disparate impact model) was inserted into Title VII by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.
L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074 (1991). The language, however, was not
inserted into other anti-discrimination statutes, such as the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act and the Fair Housing Act. Where the Civil Rights Act modifies the
common law, then, complex questions can arise about whether the Act's language should
also apply to these other antidiscrimination statutes. See, eg., Berlett v. Cargill, Inc., 780
F. Supp. 560, 562 n.8 (N.D. 11. 1991) (discussing Civil Rights Act's application under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Cato v. Jilek, 779 F. Supp. 937, 943-44 & n.19
(N.D. Ill. 1991) (discussing Civil Rights Act's application under the Fair Housing Act).
These issues are important, but are outside the scope of our primary focus.
11. More formally, the model requires (1) that a population be identified, (2) that the
pass rates for the protected and non-protected classes be determined, and (3) that the two
pass rates be compared to determine if the difference is sufficiently large to be legally
cognizable. Thus, if the employment practice is a test that eliminates 50% of black
applicants and no white applicants from consideration: (1) the population consists of all
applicants taking the test, (2) the pass rate for black and white applicants is 50% and
100% respectively, and (3) the ratio of black-to-white pass rates is 50%, which is
sufficiently small to satisfy the generally accepted four-fifths rule for determining that a
disparate impact exists. The four-fifths rule is described infra at note 22.
12. In part II infra we provide a fuller description of concurrence and a number of
more detailed examples. See infra notes 17-25 and accompanying text.
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"particular employment practice" causes a disparate impact? 3 Or
assume that both practices cause a disparate impact if all applicants
are considered and that the test, but not the high school diploma
requirement, is business justified.14  In this situation, if the two
practices tend to screen out the same applicants, it is possible that the
high school diploma requirement (which, remember, does have a
disparate impact if all applicants are considered) would not have a
disparate impact if only applicants who meet the employer's legitimate
practice (the test) are considered.15 Has the plaintiff established a
prima facie case against the high school diploma requirement, or has
she failed to show that it "causes" a disparate impact? We call this
type of situation-situations in which employers use two or more
practices relevant to disparate impact determination-concurrence.
Second, we focused on situations in which the employer uses only
one employment practice explicitly (e.g., a test), but the practice
applies to a heterogeneous population (e.g., one whose members have
different levels of education). Once again, many permutations are
possible. 6 Assume, for example, that an employer uses a test as a
screening mechanism and that some applicants have a high school
diploma and others do not. It is possible that the test might have a
disparate impact upon black applicants if all applicants are considered,
but no disparate impact on black applicants in either of the two
possible subgroupings: applicants with and applicants without a high
school diploma. If a plaintiff shows this, has he demonstrated that the
test causes a disparate impact? Similarly, it is possible that the test
might not have a disparate impact against black applicants overall, but
have a disparate impact in each of the two subgroupings. Once again,
does this establish a prima facie case, or not? We call this type of
situation-situations in which employers use one criterion but apply
it to a heterogeneous population-stratification.
In this Article, we use both concurrence and stratification as
lenses to obtain a better view of the disparate impact model and as
objects of study in their own right. We begin in Part II by describing
13. We address this point in parts II and IV.A. infra.
14. Proving that an employment practice is "business justified" is the primary defense
to a disparate impact claim. If an employer can demonstrate that a practice is "job related
for the position in question and consistent with business necessity," the employer can
continue to use the practice, despite its disparate impact. Title VII, § 703(k)(1)(A)(i), 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. V 1993).
15. This scenario is pursued further in part III infra.
16. In part II we provide an extended description of stratification and a number of
more detailed examples. See infra notes 26-39 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 74
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the two concepts in more detail. We define concurrence and
stratification and provide numerical examples of the principal
possibilities. In addition, we distinguish the two concepts from other
situations with which they might be confused. In Part III, we use
concurrence and stratification as lenses to deconstruct the disparate
impact model. These lenses help us to see the disparate impact model
in a new way-to discern its features better, to isolate the principal
ways in which it is distinct from the disparate treatment model, to see
mistakes in how others have viewed the model, and to think again
and more productively about the model's underlying purpose. In Part
IV, we turn to the lenses themselves and explore the appropriate legal
treatment of concurrence and stratification, keeping in mind the
insights gained from Part III. Concluding remarks are provided in
Part V.
II. DESCRIBING THE LENSES: CONCURRENCE AND
STRATIFICATION
In this section we present a set of numerical examples to
illustrate the concurrence and stratification lenses.'7 Although the
lenses themselves are conceptual in nature, 8 a full understanding of
how they operate, and what their implications are for disparate impact
analysis, is best achieved by viewing numerical demonstrations of the
power of the lenses in hypothetical disparate impact situations. 9 As
17. The reader who is willing to accept on faith that paradoxical or apparently
contradictory situations can arise in disparate impact analysis depending on how variables
are considered together may wish to move directly to part II.C, infra. We recommend,
however, that readers bear with us and examine carefully the examples we present in this
section. The types of paradoxes we present are similar to those that have plagued social
science, see infra note 33, and in turn, have affected public policy. We think these
examples will help readers to develop an awareness of the problem.
18. That is, we can describe concurrence and stratification from nonnumerical,
conceptual perspectives. Both concurrence and stratification represent situations in which,
when we consider two or more factors together with regard to a single issue, the
implications for the issue appear different than when we examine each factor individually.
Concurrence and stratification are distinguishable on a conceptual dimension as well.
Concurrence requires that we put the two or more factors on "equal footing'-i.e., none
of the factors is targeted as more important; we consider all of the factors to be inter-
changeable in level of importance. Stratification requires that one factor (or possibly
more) is the target factor of interest, while the other factors play a secondary role in
helping us to understand the implications created by the target factor. This conceptual
distinction emerges more fully beginning with part II.C, infra.
19. Although the data in each example are hypothetical, there is nothing particularly
contrived about these data. Instead, the hypothetical situations are quite realistic (at least
numerically), and the apparently conflicting inferences that we draw from these examples
could easily occur in real employment situations.
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we shall see in the following discussion, both lenses lead to new
insights and considerations in determining how an impact is to be
determined. Ultimately, therefore, they help us to rethink the
standards for legal causation in disparate impact analysis.
A. The Concurrence Lens
The concurrence lens applies when an employer uses two or more
selection mechanisms or components together as part of the overall
selection process. The concurrence lens demonstrates that an
employer's selection mechanisms, when considered in isolation from
each other, may reveal a different outcome about disparate impact
than when the mechanisms are considered jointly. To see this,
consider the data given in Table 1.
TABLE 1: CONCURRENCE EXAMPLE I
Diploma No Diploma Totals
At Least 5 70 women 30 women 100 women
Years Experience 400 men 10 men 410 men
Less Than 5 130 women 10 women 140 women
Years Experience 350 men 60 men 410 men
Totals 200 women 40 women 240 women
750 men 70 men 820 men
If the employer depicted in Table 1 requires applicants to have
both a high school diploma and at least five years of related job
experience in order to be considered qualified, then only 70 women
and 400 men in the relevant population meet this definition of
qualified. Assuming that the relevant population consists of 240
women and 820 men,' the pass rates for women and men based on
overall qualification are 70/240 or .29 and 400/820 or .49, respec-
20. Population issues and their relationship to concurrence will be discussed infra in
part II.C.2.
[Vol. 74
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tively2 ' A disparate impact would be evident by the four-fifths
ruleP because the ratio of the pass rate for women to the pass rate
for men is .29/.49, or .59.3 Because the pass rate for women is only
59% of the pass rate for men, the employer's use of both selection
mechanisms to determine who is qualified produces a disparate impact
on women.
Suppose, however, that the women challenging the two selection
mechanisms were required to show the disparate impact of each
selection mechanism separately. Is it necessarily true that two
mechanisms operating together to produce an impact will also show
a similar impact when examined separately? The answer is no, as
seen from Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 replicates the educational
requirement data from Table 1 (i.e., it represents the "totals" data in
the last row of Table 1); Table 3 similarly replicates the experience
data totals from the last column of Table 1.
21. Pass rates (or selection rates) are the percentage of a protected class category that
"pass" or meet the qualification criteria. We use the term "pass rate" rather than the
synonym "selection rate," because in fact not all applicants or employees who "pass" the
required criteria for qualification are actually selected.
The reader should suspend legal judgment regarding the appropriateness of
considering both employer criteria for qualification together. The legal issues will be
discussed later. See infra part IV. For now, we are merely concerned with introducing the
mathematical or statistical possibilities of what could actually happen in employment
situations in which the employer uses two (or more) criteria as part of the selection
process.
22. The four-fifths rule is the dominant approach for determining whether an
employer's selection criterion has systematically damaged the plaintiff's protected class
status. The EEOC states the rule as:
A selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths
(4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the highest rate will
generally be regarded ... as evidence of adverse impact, while a greater than
four-fifths rate will generally not be regarded.., as evidence of adverse impact.
29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(d) (1994).
Alternatively, some courts have relied on a test of statistical significance to determine
whether the pass rates for the plaintiff class and the comparator group are different. See
PAETZOLD & WILLBORN, supra note 5, § 5.07, for a discussion of the use of statistical
significance in disparate impact cases.
In general, the mathematical and statistical issues that we present in this paper do not
rely on any one methodology for measuring disparate impact. In other words, the
concurrence and stratification lenses that we consider are meaningful regardless of whether
the four-fifths rule or statistical significance is used to establish the existence of a disparate
impact. For simplicity, we will evaluate our examples under the four-fifths rule alone.
23. For simplicity, many calculations in part II are made to only two decimal places.
This can produce round-off error; i.e., it can lead to error in the final numerical outcome
as a result of rounding that occurs in intermediate calculations. Calculations using as many
decimal places as possible would minimize the round-off error, but would not be
particularly enlightening for our discussion.
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TABLE 2: EDUCATION ALONE
Women Men Total
Diploma 200 750 950
No Diploma 40 70 110
Total 240 820
TABLE 3: EXPERIENCE ALONE
Women Men Total
At Least 5
Years Experience 100 410 510
Less Than 5
Years Experience 140 410 550
Total 240 820
From Table 2, the pass rate for women based on educational
attainment alone is 200/240, or .83, while the pass rate for men is
750/820, or .91. Because .83/.91 = .91, the four-fifths requirement is
met, and the diploma requirement does not have a disparate impact
on women. Table 3 shows that the pass rate for women based on
experience alone (100/240 = .42) is 84% of the pass rate for men
(410/820 = .50), indicating that the four-fifths rule would not signal a
disparate impact for that criterion either. Thus, even though the two
criteria produce a disparate impact when used together, neither
criterion individually has a disparate impact on women.
The reverse is also possible: Two criteria may each produce a
disparate impact when considered individually, but fail to produce one
[Vol. 74
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when considered together. For example, consider a group of 200
women and 700 men distributed as illustrated in Table 4.24
TABLE 4: CONCURRENCE EXAMPLE [I
Diploma No Diploma Totals
At Least 5 70 women 30 women 100 women
Years Experience 300 men 200 men 500 men
Less Than 5 30 women 70 women 100 women
Years Experience 200 men 0 men 200 men
Totals 100 women 100 women 200 women
500 men 200 men 700 men
For this particular distribution of men and women, 70 women and
300 men have both qualifications; the pass rate for women based on
both qualifications together is 70/200 = .35; the comparable pass rate
for men is 300/700 = .43. Thus, the four-fifths rule apparently
indicates that there is no disparate impact (.35/.43 = .81). In other
words, when considering both employer requirements together, no
disparate impact exists.
Each employer requirement considered by itself, however, does
exclude women disproportionately. For the education requirement
alone, only 100 of 200 women (50%) have a diploma, whereas 500 of
700 men (71%) have a diploma. The four-fifths rule indicates a
disparate impact for the diploma requirement because 50%/71% =
70%. Similarly, because the numbers are identical for the experience
requirement,' a disparate impact on women exists for this re-
quirement as well.
The concurrence lens provides a new view of disparate impact
analysis by focusing on the differing pictures that selection criteria can
give, depending upon whether they are viewed separately or together.
Examining factual evidence through the lens of concurrence suggests
a revisiting of how impact is measured: Should employer re-
24. Once again, we assume this to be the relevant population for the purpose of this
analysis. See infra part II.C.2.
25. In other words, 100 of 200 women (50%) have at least five years of experience,
and 500 of 700 men (71%) have at leasf five years of experience.
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quirements for qualification be considered together when assessing
impact, or should each requirement's impact be evaluated by itself?
The concurrence lens makes clear that whether a disparate impact
exists may depend on how the employer's requirements are con-
sidered. Therefore, the legal rule regarding how criteria are to be
considered can determine the legal outcome.
B. The Stratification Lens
The stratification lens applies to situations in which an employer
uses a selection mechanism or criterion that is being applied to a
heterogeneous group of potential employees.26  Suppose that an
employer subjects applicants to a selection test, which they must pass
in order to be eligible for employment. A fixed cut-off score is used
to determine those individuals who pass the exam. The test is being
challenged as having a disparate impact on women. What quan-
titative evidence can be used to establish that there is a disparate
impact on women?
In a typical disparate impact case, the plaintiff would establish a
prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination by showing an
aggregate impact on her protected class.' Thus, for example, if the
data revealed the pattern indicated in Table 5, the plaintiff would be
able to show that a disparate impact on women exists. In the
aggregate, the pass rate for women is less than four-fifths of the pass
rate for men (.50/.66 = .757).
26. Assume that the employer has requested education information about applicants,
and that the information that has been maintained by the employer indicates only whether
the applicant has a college degree. This information will be used to construct the
stratifying variable. See, e.g., infra Tables 6 and 7. We assume throughout the discussion
of the stratification examples that the employer does not use education as a criterion for
selection.
27. The prima facie requirements for a case of disparate impact have typically been
applied to aggregate data. See infra part III.
It is assumed that all applicants over a relevant time period who have taken the exam
are included in Table 5. It is also assumed that the applicant pool is the appropriate proxy
for the population that would be ready, willing, and able to fill the job at issue. Thus,
there is no concern that the population is too broadly or too narrowly defined in this
instance. See infra part II.C.2.
336 [Vol. 74
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TABLE 5: AGGREGATE TEST DATA I
Pass Fail Total Pass Rate
Men 400 200 600 .66
Women 200 200 400 .50
Total 600 400 1000 .60
The aggregate analysis based on Table 5 data did not consider
whether performance on the test may be associated with any factors
other than sex. These other factors, however, may affect disparate
impact analysis to the extent that they are associated both with sex
and with the pass rates. For example, educational level is a variable
that may differ across sex (and would therefore be "associated" with
sex) and that may be associated with different pass rates. When we
consider the educational level of the test-takers in our hypothetical,
we get the results obtained in Table 6.
TABLE 6: STRATIFICATION I OVER TABLE 5 DATA
Pass Fail Total Pass Rate
Non-College
Graduates
Men 150 200 350 .43
Women 115 180 295 .39
College Graduates
Men 250 0 250 1.00
Women 85 20 105 .81
For this demographic breakdown of men and women, note that
the pass rates for men and women within the same level of
educational background are similar in magnitude.' In other words,
28. At this point we consider the levels of educational background independently of
each other in comparing men's and women's pass rates because such a comparison reveals
the difficulty associated with the presentation in Table 5. However, for many stratification
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for non-college graduates, the pass rate for women is 91% of the pass
rate for men (i.e., .39/.43 = .91). Similarly, for college graduates, the
pass rate for women is 81% of the pass rate for men (i.e., .81/1.00 =
.81). Both pass rate ratios satisfy the four-fifths rule and, hence,
indicate no disparate impact.
By considering the additional variable-educational level-our
inference about the relationship between protected class and passing
the exam appears to have changed.29 For the aggregate data
(presented in Table 5), an inference of disparate impact on women
has been demonstrated using the four-fifths rule. For the stratified (or
equivalently, disaggregated) data (the Table 5 data broken down by
two levels of education in Table 6), no disparate impact on women
can be inferred within either of the two levels. Thus, consideration
of a third factor may well affect the nature of the appropriate legal
inferences.
Now consider another variation of Table 5, which may once again
alter our inferences by considering the educational level of those
persons taking the test. The test-takers are now distributed across
educational levels as indicated in Table 7.
TABLE 7: STRATIFICATION II OVER TABLE 5 DATA
Pass Fail Total Pass Rate
Non-College
Graduates
Men 300 200 500 .60
Women 80 20 100 .80
College Graduates
Men 100 0 100 1.00
Women 120 180 300 .40
situations it is inappropriate to make any statistical inferences for individual levels.
Information from the levels would be pooled to create one summary inference regarding
the relationship between pass rate and sex. See infra note 232 and accompanying text.
29. The reader should suspend judgment on the appropriateness of the use of
education to evaluate the effect of the test on the protected class. Legal arguments appear
in part IV infra. For now, we are concerned only with inferences that would seem to be
appropriate given that we accept the appropriateness of education as a factor relevant to
the issue of disparate impact.
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For this breakdown of men and women across educational level,
a very different pattern emerges than the one seen in Table 6. Here,
for those persons who are non-college graduates, the pass rate of
women is actually greater than the pass rate of men! No inference of
disparate impact on women would be warranted for this group.0
Within the group of college graduates, however, the pass rate for
women is only 40% of the pass rate for men, providing strong
evidence of a disparate impact on women. The four-fifths rule, if
applied to this level, would give rise to an inference that a dispropor-
tionate percentage of women have failed the test.3 ' A conflict
emerges in the pass rate evidence based on the two possible levels of
educational attainment.
For the same aggregate data (as presented in Table 5), we have
now seen two very different possible stratifications over educational
level. Perhaps the first stratification (Table 6) is the more striking:
Even though, in the aggregate, a disparate impact on women seems
apparent, any statistical evidence of a disparity associated with the
test completely disappears with the introduction of two levels of
education! The outcome seems paradoxical, and is in fact referred
to as one type of "aggregation paradox."33  In this type of ag-
gregation paradox, statistically inappropriate aggregation over a third
variable (here, as when education is ignored in Table 5) produces the
apparent disparity. Statistical inferences based on the aggregation are
unreliable, because the third variable confounds the relationship
between sex and pass rate.34 In these situations, the "true" relation-
30. In fact, an inference of a disparate impact on men could be warranted. In other
words, men could demonstrate that their pass rate is only 75% of the pass rate for women
(i.e., .60/.80 = .75), thereby supporting a showing of disparate impact under the four-fifths
rule.
31. See supra note 22.
32. Here we mean that for each of the two levels, there is no evidence of a disparate
impact. Once again, creation of one summary measure across these two levels to assess
whether a disparate impact exists may be appropriate. See supra note 28.
33. Aggregation paradoxes are well-known in the statistics literature, and to a lesser
extent, in the social science literature. See, e.g., Joel E. Cohen, An Uncertainty Principle
in Demography and the Unisex Issue, 40 AM. STATISTICIAN 32 (1986); M.J. Goddard,
Constructing Some Categorical Anomalies, 45 AM. STATISTICIAN 129 (1991); Clifford H.
Wagner, Simpson's Paradox in Real Life, 36 AM. STATISTICIAN 46 (1982).
34. In general, a third variable has a confounding effect when the direction of the
relationship between the other two variables is unaltered, but the magnitude of the
relationship changes. In other words, the presence of a confounding variable either
strengthens or weakens the aggregate relationship between two other variables. Further
consideration of legal issues when "confounding variables" are involved appears in part
IV.B infra.
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ship between sex and pass rate cannot be known without stratifying
over the third variable.35
The second stratification (Table 7) raises a somewhat different
issue. Here, the aggregate disparity between men and women results
from a disparity for one category of persons only-those having a
college degree. For the other category, the opposite legal in-
ference-that of a disparate impact on men-exists. This type of
effect by a stratifying variable produces what is called a moderating
effect or an interaction.16  Once again, the "true" relationship
between sex and pass rate cannot be fully understood without
stratifying over the third variable. In this situation, however, the
actual direction of the relationship between sex and pass rate changes,
depending on the level of the stratifying variable. Thus, any disparate
impact on women that the test imposed could only be said to exist for
those persons who are college graduates, and an opposing statistical
relationship would exist for those persons who are not college
graduates.
Finally, let us consider one more example of potential problems
with aggregation in disparate impact analysis. Consider Table 8.
TABLE 8: AGGREGATE TEST DATA II
Pass Fail Total Pass Rate
Men 50 60 110 .45
Women 60 40 100 .60
Here, there is no apparent disparate impact on women for these
aggregate data. 7 A stratifying variable, however, may possibly
reveal the existence of a disparate impact for women within each of
its levels. In Table 9, the test disadvantages women in each of two
levels of education.
35. Less extreme examples can also reflect the effects of confounding. As long as the
pass rate of women remains less than the pass rate of men for each educational level, but
the magnitude of the relationship between the pass rates changes so as to produce
different inferences, a confounding relationship exists.
36. The moderating effect or interaction exists in addition to a confounding effect; in
other words, confounding is also always present when moderation or interaction occurs.
37. The absence of an impact is apparent in the fact that the pass rate for women is
actually higher than the pass rate for men. Once again, we assume that the appropriate
population has been considered for this analysis. See infra part II.C.2.
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TABLE 9: STRATIFICATION OVER TABLE 8 DATA
Pass Fail Total Pass Rate
College Graduates
Men 20 0 20 1.00
Women 60 20 80 .75
Non-College
Graduates
Men 30 60 90 .33
Women 0 20 20 .00
For college graduates the women's pass rate is only 75% of the
men's; for non-college graduates, the pass rate of women is zero, but
it is substantially higher (.33) for men. Thus, it is possible for no
disparate impact to exist in the aggregate, even though within some
or even all levels of a stratifying variable, the impact does exist.
The stratification lens thus makes clear that consideration of the
employer's selection mechanism alone does not resolve all issues
regarding the cause of an impact.39  When the factual evidence is
38. The pass rates for non-college graduates highlight one difficulty with the four-fifths
rule: If the pass rate for the plaintiff group is zero, then the four-fifths rule always
provides a showing of an adverse impact. In other words, the pass rate of zero divided by
any positive pass rate for the comparator group will be zero, which is less than eighty
percent.
Statistical significance can reveal whether the zero pass rate for women appears to be
significantly different than the pass rate for men. In our example, it may seem intuitively
clear that zero and .33 are significantly different from each other. If the pass rate for men
had been .10, or perhaps .05, it would not seem as intuitively clear, however. Statistical
significance can provide a somewhat more rigorous test of our intuition by relying on
probability theory to determine when two percentages are different from each other. See,
e.g., JOSEPH L. FLEISS, STATISTICAL METHODS FOR RATES AND PROPORTIONS chs. 5-6
(2d ed. 1981); HAROLD J. LARSON, INTRODUCTION TO PROBABILITY THEORY AND
STATISTICAL INFERENCE ch. 7 (3d ed. 1982).
Notice that in Table 9 it is not the "inexorable zero," International Bhd. of Teamsters
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 342 n.23 (1977) (considering systemic disparate treatment),
that produces the apparent impact for non-college graduates; even if one woman had
passed the test and 19 had failed, there would still be an impact under the four-fifths rule.
39. This is true regardless of whether the employer uses only one selection mechanism
or multiple selection mechanisms. Even within the concurrence lens it is possible that
stratification over additional factors may reveal a different pattern of inference than would
be seen without consideration of the stratifying factors.
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viewed through the lens of stratification, the possibility of other,
additional factors creating the relationship with protected status
becomes problematic. The existence of an impact may be attributable
to factors other than those imposed by the employer. Thus, the
stratification lens highlights the importance of revisiting the meaning
of causation in the disparate impact model.
C. Distinguishing Concurrence and Stratification from Other Issues
At first glance, the concurrence and stratification lenses probably
conjure up other familiar notions from discrimination law. Issues of
aggregation versus more precise specification abound in this area.4"
For example, "bottom line" issues in employment discrimination law
involve consideration of an employer's entire selection process,
thereby implicating more than one selection mechanism. Thus,
"bottom line" issues seem to be closely connected with concurrence.
Similarly, selection of an appropriate population against which to
measure the potential adverse impact may, at first glance, seem to
subsume both concurrence and stratification lenses. Selecting an
appropriate population depends on notions of how an employer would
A more detailed discussion of multiple causation and the disparate impact model
appears in part III infra.
40. One important class of problems that is tangentially related to our discussion
involves plaintiffs having more than one protected class status. Whether the multiple
protected class statuses should be considered simultaneously continues to be an important
legal issue, particularly for academics. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the
Complex Female Subject, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2479,2497-98 (1994) (arguing that the courts
should be more responsive to claims of discrimination against more than one protected
classification); Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist
Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 166-67 (arguing that the courts fail to recognize race-
sex claims and that this failure marginalizes the experiences of non-white women); Elaine
W. Shoben, Compound Discrimination: The Interaction of Race and Sex in Employment
Discrimination, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793, 807-11 (1980) (labeling discrimination based on a
combination of protected statuses as compound discrimination and proposing a statistical
methodology for analyzing such claims); Judith A. Winston, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall:
Title VII, Section 1981, and the Intersection of Race and Gender in the Civil Rights Act of
1990, 79 CAL. L. REv. 775, 796-97 (1991) (arguing that claims of race-based gender
discrimination are analytically distinct from race or gender claims and, thus, require a
distinct legal construct).
Additionally, whether categories within a protected class status should be aggregated
to measure disparate impact is an important and problematic issue for courts. See, e.g.,
Guinyard v. City of New York, 800 F. Supp. 1083, 1089 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (considering
whether blacks and Hispanics should be aggregated because they might face similar
employment problems).
Although these issues are interesting, their tangential nature requires that we withhold
further discussion of them for a later day.
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have made selections in the absence of discrimination. Thus, it calls
into question the employer's stated qualifications for a job and seems
to require designation of a fairly homogeneous group of potential
applicants. Both of these areas relate to, and shed light on, the
concurrence and stratification lenses, but are distinguishable from
them. Also, consideration of these other notions helps us to delineate
further the distinctions between concurrence and stratification
themselves.
1. Bottom Line Issues
A "bottom line" impact, or the lack thereof, is a well-known
concept in disparate impact analysis." The bottom line issue arises
in employment discrimination cases only when a selection system has
at least two levels: an initial screening level (or levels), and a
"bottom line" level at which the ultimate employment decision is
made. For example, in Connecticut v. Teal,4' the leading bottom line
case, persons interested in promotion first had to pass an initial
screening level by attaining a certain score on a written examination.
Then promotions were made "at the bottom line" based on prior
work performance, recommendations, and seniority from among those
who had "passed" the examination.43 Although bottom line issues
may appear to overlap with concurrence or stratification issues,
important distinctions exist.
a. Distinguishing Concurrence from Bottom Line
There are really two ways in which the concept of "bottom line"
can be interpreted, based on two different readings of Teal. There
the "bottom line" referred to the overall outcome of the selection
process, in which the promotion rate for blacks was nearly 1.7 times
greater than the promotion rate for whites.' Thus, the ultimate
41. The leading case is Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982), which held that the
absence of a disparate impact at the bottom line is not a defense to a disparate impact
claim. Id. at 442. A considerable body of literature has analyzed Teal and the bottom line
issue. See, e.g., Alfred W. Blumrosen, The Group Interest Concept, Employment
Discrimination, and Legislative Intent: The Fallacy of Connecticut v. Teal, 20 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 99 (1983); Chamallas, supra note 6.
42. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
43. Id at 444.
44. Id. at 440 & n.6. In Teal, the employer argued that no disparate impact had
occurred because, of all persons who were in the initial selection pool, the proportion of
blacks who were promoted was greater than the proportion of whites who were promoted.
Id. at 440 n.6. Alternatively, the employer could have argued that no disparate impact had
occurred because, of those persons who passed the test, the proportion of blacks who went
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focus was on the employer's final employment-related decision-who
was hired, promoted, or fired. Teal held that employers could not use
this "bottom line" as a defense to a selection mechanism (an
examination) that resulted in a disparate impact." Thus, although
as a class, blacks fared better than whites in terms of the percentage
promoted, the use of the examination to determine who was qualified
to be promoted still excluded some individual blacks.46
A narrow reading of Teal would suggest that the prohibited
"bottom line" defense is restricted to those cases in which the bottom
line reflects the employer's actual selection decision. In other words,
the employer could not rely on what appears to be "good citizenship"
behavior in actual hiring or promotion practices to absolve itself of
liability for the use of selection mechanisms that erect barriers for one
or more groups. Under this interpretation, concurrence is distin-
guishable from "bottom line" issues. Concurrence, in general, does
not concern the employer's final decision, but instead concerns only
whether the screening levels (qualifying variables) should be
considered separately or together.47 Thus, in this sense the concur-
rence issue precedes any "bottom line" issues.
A broader reading of Teal, however, suggests that concurrence
and "bottom line" issues overlap. The rationale for the Court's
decision was that Title VII prohibits practices that tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities.4 Thus, even though blacks
as a class had a higher promotion rate than whites, the examination
on to be promoted was greater than the proportion of whites who went on to be
promoted. The first argument considers the effect of the screening and selection levels
together, and is therefore a simultaneous depiction of the bottom line. The second
argument depends on an analysis of those persons who survived the initial screening level,
and this is a bottom line argument subsequent to the initial screening level. The Court's
discussion in Teal made clear that the Court rejected both types of bottom line arguments.
See iL at 448-51, 453-56.
45. Id. at 450-51.
46. Id. at 452-56.
47. For example, in Tables 1 and 4 the two screening levels were qualifying variables
involving education and experience. The employer need not have hired all of those who
satisfied both qualifications. The concurrence issue was whether the effect of the two
screening qualifications should be considered together or separately in assessing the pool
of applicants available for hire.
Admittedly, however, there could be instances in which an initial screening level and
the remaining selection process could be two components that would be considered
together, perhaps because the remaining selection process was so subjective that it could
not be further separated for analysis. In this instance, the use of the initial screening level
with the remaining selection process would be an example of concurrence, and would
involve the employer's ultimate selection decisions.
48. Teal, 457 U.S. at 453-56.
[Vol. 74
1996] DECONSTRUCTING DISPARATE IMPACT 345
disproportionately excluded individual blacks who then had no
opportunity for promotion. This reading indicates that concurrence
and bottom line issues can overlap, because individual employment
mechanisms may disproportionately exclude individuals of a minority
group, yet considered concurrently, the mechanisms do not tend to
disadvantage the group.49 This possible overlap will be revisited
later.5 0
b. Distinguishing Stratification from Bottom Line
Bottom line issues are always distinct from stratification issues,
because bottom line issues can arise only when two or more
employment practices are in play-one (or more) at a screening level
and one (or more) at the bottom line level. Stratification issues arise
when a single employment practice is applied to a heterogeneous
group. The stratifying variable is never an actual employment
practice.'
c. Relevant Implications of Bottom Line Analysis
Bottom line analysis emphasizes causation, which is important for
both the concurrence and stratification lenses. The causation issue
arises in two distinct ways.
First, what should happen when a screening level has a disparate
impact, but none exists at the bottom line? Connecticut v. Teal, 2
and later the Civil Rights Act of 1991,' indicate that the bottom line
is irrelevant in this situation. A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case
of disparate impact discrimination by demonstrating that the screening
level has a disparate impact; an employer cannot defend by
demonstrating that no disparate impact exists at the bottom line.
Instead the employer must demonstrate that business necessity
justifies the screening level practice.54
49. See supra Table 4 and corresponding textual discussion.
50. See infra part IV.A.
51. Whether the test and the final promotion decision in Teal should be considered
separately, or in conjunction with each other, falls within our concurrence lens because
both stages are part of the employer's selection procedure. The stratification lens is
different, because it presents analytical issues that arise when the stratifying variable does
not represent an actual employer selection procedure.
52. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
53. Title VII, § 703(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (Supp. V 1993).
54. This is true regardless of whether the "bottom line" analysis relied on is the
"subsequent" or "concurrent" version. See supra note 44.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The courts have also considered the proper outcome when a
disparate impact exists at the bottom line, but there is either no
evidence as to whether a disparate impact exists at prior screening
levels or evidence that no disparate impact exists at one or more of
the prior levels. The Supreme Court5 and, once again, the Civil
Rights Act of 199156 make clear that it is part of the plaintiff's
burden to indicate the particular screening level that produces the
disparate impact. Evidence of a disparate impact at the bottom line,
without more, is insufficient to make out a prima facie case.17 The
Civil Rights Act of 1991,58 however, permits the plaintiff to make out
a prima facie case based on a disparate impact at the bottom line if
the plaintiff can prove that the prior screening levels "are not capable
of separation for analysis."59 In this situation, the employer need not
prove business necessity for a particular screening level if it can
demonstrate that the employment practice at that level does not have
a disparate impact.6
Whether or not prior screening levels are capable of separation
for analysis implicates the concurrence issue. In Tables 1 and 4, for
example, education and experience were clearly separable factors in
the employer's set of requirements for qualification; not only are they
conceptually different, but discrete data exists on each. Nevertheless,
they are arguably not separable for analysis, because the employer
uses them together as a screening device; therefore their joint effect
cannot be determined without considering them concurrently. If the
rationale for requiring the plaintiff to isolate the particular
employment practice is to increase the precision in identifying an
impact's cause61 then the requirement should not be used to
eliminate concurrence arguments. Concurrence provides a more
precise picture of whether, and why, an impact exists. Because
congressional concern was with undifferentiated "bottom line"
statistics, in which the effects of prior screening levels are unknown,
55. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656-58 (1989) (holding that the
plaintiff must identify the particular screening level alleged to create a disparate impact);
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988) (plurality opinion)
(indicating that the particular subjective criterion must be identified by plaintiff).
56. Title VII, § 703(k)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
57. See supra notes 55 and 56.
58. Title VII, § 703(k)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
59. Title VII, § 703(k)(1)(B)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 20Oe-2(k)(1)(B)(i) (Supp. V 1993). For
a discussion of this issue, see infra part IV.A.1.
60. Title VIII, § 703(k)(1)(B)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 20t0e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) (Supp. V 1993).
61. A further discussion of the key role of causation, and the tangential role of the
particular employment mechanism appears in part III infra.
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the requirement that plaintiffs identify the mechanism that produces
the disparate impact should not prohibit concurrence arguments. In
these types of situations, evidence concerning the prior screening
levels is known, and the evidence demonstrates that it is precisely the
concurrence of two or more such screening levels that produces the
disparate impact.62
The "bottom line" concerns reflect the importance of causation in
disparate impact analysis, and therefore also shed light on the
importance of both concurrence and stratification. T1he bottom line
cases indicate that precision in identifying the employer's role in
causing a disparate impact is not only important, but crucial.
Consequently, the cases also implicitly suggest that concurrence and
stratification are important analytical techniques in disparate impact
cases-both are tools for improving the precision of identifying
employer causation.
2. Population Issues
Population issues may also be confused with concurrence and
stratification issues. A disparate impact is measurable only with
respect to a particular population, which must be identified. For
example, in Dothard v. Rawlinson,63 the Alabama Board of Correc-
tions would only hire prison guards64 who met minimum height and
weight requirements. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs had
demonstrated a disparate impact on women based on height and
weight statistics for the United States as a whole.6 Justice White
thought that the plaintiffs had failed to establish a prima facie case
because they had not presented any evidence on the height and
weight of men and women in the relevant population, that is, persons
interested in prison guard jobs. 66
62. See infra part IV.A.
63. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
64. Prison guards were called "correctional counselors" in the actual case. Id. at 323.
65. Id. at 329-30 & n.12. The Court used both separate and concurrent statistics to
determine that a disparate impact on women existed. The height requirement would have
excluded 33.29% of relevant women and only 1.28% of relevant men. Id. at 329. The
weight requirement would have excluded 22.29% of relevant women and 2.35% of relevant
men. Id. Together, the height and weight requirements would have excluded 41.13% of
relevant women and 0.24% of relevant men. See id. at 329-30 & n.12.
Because the focus was on the appropriate population to be used, and not on the types
of calculations that could be conducted based on the population, the Dothard Court did
not address the concurrence issue.
66. Ld. at 348 (White, J., dissenting). The majority had noted that a showing of
adverse impact need not always be based on the actual applicant pool, particularly in
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The population issue is important; it can significantly affect
whether a cognizable disparate impact exists. But it is not the same
as either the concurrence or stratification issues; it logically precedes
these issues. The appropriate population in a disparate impact case
includes those who were subject to the criterion at issue or who would
have been subject to it in the absence of discrimination.67 It
excludes all others. Concurrence or stratification arguments can occur
only after that population has been selected. In Dothard, for
example, the joint (or concurrent) effect of the height and weight
requirements would be ascertainable only after selection of the
population.68 Thus, concurrence and stratification operate within the
appropriate population and, as a result, can only be analyzed after the
population has been specified.
D. Court Allusions to Concurrence and Stratification in Disparate
Impact Analysis
1. Concurrence
Although disparate impact cases often involve challenges to
multiple selection criteria,69 few cases have addressed the concur-
situations such as this in which potential applicants could easily determine that they did
not meet the height and weight requirements and would therefore be unlikely to apply.
kd. at 330. The burden was on the defendant to introduce evidence indicating that the
United States as a whole was an inappropriate population-i.e., that the heights and
weights of those who would seek a job as prison guard in Alabama would be different
from those in the national pool. See id. at 331. Additional discussion of the population
issue in general can be obtained from PAETZOLD & WILLBORN, supra note 5, § 5.04.
67. In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), the Supreme Court
indicated that a population is too broad if it contains persons who would not be applicants
for the at-issue job and too narrow if it excludes qualified persons in the labor force who
would be interested in the at-issue job. Id. at 653-55. As a result, in Dothard, the
appropriate population needed to include individuals who would have been interested and
otherwise qualified for the job, but who did not meet either the height or the weight
requirement, or both. The applicant pool was not used as the appropriate population in
Dothard because, inter alia, it might not have reflected all individuals who would have
applied for the job, absent the height and/or weight requirements. Dothard, 433 U.S. at
330; see also supra note 66.
68. Similarly, if it were believed that height and weight would tend to vary with type
of diet (used here merely for the sake of argument as a possible stratifying variable that
would intuitively relate to an individual's height and weight), the impact on women of
using the height and weight requirements when potential employees might have differing
diets could only be ascertained upon selection of a population of individuals. A discussion
of appropriateness of stratifying variables appears infra part IV.B.
69. A multitude of cases involve disparate impact challenges of multiple selection
criteria. Two recent cases involving such challenges, and in which the criteria were
evaluated separately by the court, are Legault v. aRusso, 842 F. Supp. 1479, 1485-87
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rence issue explicitly. Prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,0
it was not clear that the plaintiff had the burden of isolating the
distinct employment practice that was to be challenged. Particularly
for subjective employment criteria, courts have allowed plaintiffs to
challenge large segments of or even entire selection processes. 71
Thus, the concurrence issue for plaintiffs was not explicitly raised,
because there was no focus on whether individual components or
criteria would suggest different outcomes than the concurrent
application of the components or criteria.,
Wards Cove clarified the causation requirement by indicating that
the plaintiff had to tie a showing of disparate impact to specific or
particular employment mechanisms or selection devices.72 Shortly
thereafter, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 created an exception for
mechanisms or components that were not "capable of separation for
analysis."'73 Thus, cases arising under this Act would be the ones
most likely to raise the concurrence issue. However, the courts have
not applied the Act to many disparate impact cases,74 so they have
not had the opportunity to address the concurrence issue explicitly.
(D.N.H. 1994) (involving challenges to two physical tests for firefighters); and Davis v. City
of Dallas, 748 F. Supp. 1165,1173-76 (N.D. Tex. 1990) (involving challenges to three hiring
criteria: prior marijuana use, college education, and driving record).
70. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
71. In Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988), the Supreme Court
first noted that even subjective selection mechanisms were subject to a stricter causation
analysis, requiring plaintiffs to identify the specific practice that they were challenging. Id.
at 994-97.
72. The Supreme Court noted that:
a Title VII plaintiff does not make out a case of disparate impact simply by
showing that, "at the bottom line," there is racial imbalance in the work force.
As a general matter, a plaintiff must demonstrate that it is the application of a
specific or particular employment practice that has created the impact under
attack.
Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 657.
73. Title VII, § 703(k)(1)(B)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) (Supp. V 1993).
74. A Westlaw search for the phrase "capable of separation for analysis" generated
only six cases (Allfeds database, September 1995). In only one of these cases is the issue
addressed. Graffam v. Scott Paper Co., 870 F. Supp. 389, 395 (D. Me. 1994). Plaintiffs in
Graffam challenged the selection process as a whole. Id. at 395. Although the court did
not require the plaintiffs to prove that the components were not capable of separation for
analysis, the court accepted the entire selection process as the "one employment practice"
that was to be scrutinized, noting that any other approach "would completely exempt the
situation where the adverse impact is caused by the interaction of two or more components
of the process." Id.
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2. Stratification
Very few disparate impact cases have recognized the importance
of stratification for assessing disparate impact. In only one circuit
have courts begun to address the issue seriously, and none of the
circuits have considered it carefully. The cases, however, have hinted
at the type of burden shifting that should occur when stratification is
an issue.
The Seventh Circuit has led the way in recognizing that aggregate
analyses may not be reliable evidence of a disparate impact. In Allen
v. Seidman.5 a group of black bank examiners employed by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation challenged a test used in
making promotion decisions. Overall, thirty-nine percent of the black
candidates for promotion passed the test compared to eighty-four
percent of white candidates.76  The defendants questioned this
disparity, arguing that the group of test-takers was not
homogeneous.77 The defendants argued that an affirmative action
program may have meant that black test-takers had inferior entry
qualifications and that they had fewer years of experience before
applying for promotion and taking the tests.7' Perhaps, the court
mused, these two characteristics (entry qualifications and years of
experience), rather than race, caused the disparity.79 The court
recognized that such a stratification might be relevant, but it rejected
the specific stratification argument because the employer-defendant
had not introduced any studies indicating that stratification would
have eliminated the aggregate disparity that the plaintiffs had
demonstrated. 0
75. 881 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1989). In an even earlier case, Coates v. Johnson &
Johnson, 756 F.2d 524, 540 (7th Cir. 1985), the Seventh Circuit noted that plaintiffs
attempting to make out a prima facie case of disparate impact must take into account the
most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the allegedly unfair employment practice.
Placing the burden to stratify on plaintiffs conflicts with the Seventh Circuit's later decision
in Allen, 881 F.2d at 379-80, and we disagree with it. See infra part IV.B. Our focus at
this point, however, is not on assigning burdens but on judicial recognition of the
importance of stratification.
76. Allen, 881 F.2d at 378.
77. Id. at 379-80.
78. Id.
79. We do not wish to be read as endorsing the idea that affirmative action programs
lead to the admission of minorities having inferior skills or qualifications. We use this
example merely to illustrate a stratification argument.
80. Allen, 881 F.2d at 379-80.
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Similarly, in Davidson v. Board of Governors,s8 a university
compensation scheme was challenged as producing a disparate impact
based on age. The Seventh Circuit declined to decide whether
disparate impact analysis is available in age discrimination cases, but
noted that if it were, stratification of salary data by job tenure would
be necessary in order to control for the market effect built into newer
faculty members' salaries.8 For any given group of faculty salaries
deemed relevant for salary comparison purposes, incoming faculty
members' higher market salaries must be "controlled for" (i.e.,
stratified over) in order to obtain an accurate relationship between
salary level and age.83
The concurrence and stratification lenses help to bring to light the
many situations that can arise under the rubric of disparate impact
analysis. But how should the law treat these situations? In order to
prescribe a legal framework for analyzing these more complex
situations, it is useful first to use the lenses to gain insights into the
essential nature of the disparate impact model. We now turn to this
task.
III. USING THE LENSES TO DECONSTRUCr "ORDINARY"
DISPARATE IMPAcT CASES
Under the disparate impact model, the plaintiff must demonstrate
that an "employment practice causes a disparate impact on the basis
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."'  Concurrence and
stratification complicate analysis of the causation element. Concur-
rence means that a complete analysis of causation cannot focus on a
single employment practice, but instead must consider the causal
contributions of two or more practices, if they exist. Stratification
requires that the causal effects of the employment practice be
analyzed across two or more distinct, homogeneous subpopulations,
instead of across only a single, heterogeneous one.
The place to begin analysis of the causation element, however, is
not with the relatively few cases discussing concurrence and
stratification, but with "ordinary" cases-the vast majority of cases
81. 920 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1990).
82. Id. at 446.
83. "Controlled for" in compensation examples typically means that a multiple
regression analysis is used to examine individual salary levels in a model that explicitly
accounts for factors that would produce heterogeneity in compensation. For further
discussion, see PAETZOLD & WILLBORN, supra note 5, ch. 6.
84. Title VII, § 703(k)(1)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. V 1993)
(emphasis added).
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that do not consider concurrence or stratification issues. Using
concurrence and stratification as lenses to examine the causation
element in ordinary cases, where the disparate impact model has been
well explored, provides important clues to how the causation element
should be treated in the relatively uncharted areas presented by
concurrence and stratification.85 In addition, and perhaps more
importantly, these new lenses permit us to see the disparate impact
model more clearly even in ordinary cases. They permit us to bring
the model's defining feature into sharper focus, to clarify the model's
role in the antidiscrimination effort, and to consider anew the
underlying rationale for the model's existence.
86
A. "Ordinary" Disparate Impact Cases and the Nature of Causation
Let us begin with Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,8' the prototypical
"ordinary" case. Plaintiffs established a prima facie case in Griggs by
demonstrating that a particular employment practice (the high school
diploma requirement) caused a disparate impact on blacks.88 The
Griggs plaintiffs showed causation through evidence of the effect of
the employment practice on a relevant population (North Carolina
males) differentiated only by protected group status (thirty-four
percent of whites and twelve percent of blacks in the population had
high school diplomas).8 9 The high school diploma requirement
caused9 the disparate impact because it screened out a significantly
higher proportion of blacks than whites in the relevant population. 91
85. We discuss the appropriate legal treatment of concurrence and stratification in
disparate impact cases in part IV, infra.
86. We consider these issues in part III.B, infra.
87. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
88. ld. at 428-32. The employer in Griggs also required employees to achieve a certain
score on a standardized general intelligence test. Id. For expositional purposes, we ignore
the testing requirement for the moment.
89. ld. at 430 n.6.
90. It is important to remember that the relevant issue here is legal cause, rather than
cause in a more rigorous scientific or statistical sense. In science and statistics, cause can
never be conclusively established. PAETzOLD & WILLBORN, supra note 5, § 2.05. In law,
however, and particularly in discrimination law, it is well recognized that statistical
evidence alone can be sufficient to prove legal causation, International Bhd. of Teamsters
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977), and, indeed, that statistical analysis need not
be perfect to have these legal consequences, Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400-01
(1986) (per curiam).
91. The selection rate for whites and blacks was .34 and .12, respectively. Griggs, 401
U.S. at 430 n.6. Therefore, the ratio of black-to-white selection rates was .1234, or .35.
That ratio easily satisfies the four-fifths rule requirement for a disparate impact to exist.
See supra note 22.
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This framework for analyzing causation focuses on a particular
cause (the employment practice) and, as a result, obscures the
multiple causation present in all disparate impact cases. The
employment practice was one cause of the disparate impact in Griggs;
if the employer had not required a high school diploma, the criterion
obviously could not have caused a disparate impact on blacks. But
the disparate impact was also "caused" by the social conditions that
resulted in a lower proportion of blacks than whites with high school
diplomas. The high school diploma requirement would not have
caused a disparate impact if social conditions had produced the same
proportion of high school graduates within the black and white
subpopulations. Every disparate impact case depends on an interac-
tion of at least two "causes" in this sense. In Griggs, each of the two
relevant "causes" (the employment criterion and the social conditions)
was necessary to cause the disparate impact on blacks. If either had
been absent, no disparate impact would have been present.
This view of Griggs, it should be noted, is obtained by using the
stratification lens. If we divide the population only into black and
white subgroups, the lower proportion of blacks than whites with a
high school diploma evidences a connection between race and the
diploma requirement. It is possible, however, to account for other
differences in the population. The population, for example, may
differ in the quality of teachers in elementary or secondary school, in
the financial resources of the schools attended, in the resources of
parents, and in a multitude of other factors. If stratification is used
to account for these other factors, it may be that they also tend to
explain the difference in the proportion of blacks and whites with high
school diplomas. Indeed, it is possible that these other factors fully
explain the difference, so that race ought to be rejected as a factor
associated with the difference. This, however, is not our point here
because race tends to taint many of the stratifying factors in this
example, and several others. Our point here is a narrower one: The
stratification lens helps us to see that every disparate impact case
depends on an adverse impact that is created jointly by social factors
and the employer's employment practice.
Ordinary disparate impact cases, then, view causation with
blinders. The law treats the employer's criterion as the cause of a
disparity, even though it may be only one of a wide array of factors
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necessary to produce the disparity.' Ordinary disparate impact
cases view causation with blinders, not because the cases arise in a
single-cause context, but because they ignore causes external to the
employer that contribute to the impact.93 The blinders necessarily
mean that employers may be held legally responsible for impacts that
are "caused" in substantial part by factors external to the
employers 4
92. Another way of saying this is that factors external to the employer are treated as
givens and that an employer may be held responsible for them if, jointly with the
employer's criterion, they produce a disparity.
93. Note that this "blinders" principle means only that disparate impact analysis
ignores social factors that contribute to an impact within a relevant population. The
population itself, however, may be affected by social factors. For example, consider a
hospital that requires emergency room physicians to achieve a certain score on a general
intelligence test before it will consider them for employment. The population may consist
of all emergency room physicians, and the racial composition of that group is undoubtedly
affected by numerous social factors. However, if blacks within that population meet the
test requirement less (or more) often than whites, inquiries into social factors that
contribute to the disparity are irrelevant to the disparate impact claim. For a more
detailed discussion of population issues, see supra part II.C.2.
One class of cases-the so-called "comparable worth" cases-violates the "blinders"
principle. See, e.g., Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686, 707-08 & n.11 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984); Beard v. Whitley County REMC, 656 F. Supp.
1461, 1468-70 (N.D. Ind. 1987), affd, 840 F.2d 405 (7th Cir. 1988). In these cases, one of
the plaintiffs' arguments was that the use of market forces to set wages was an
employment practice that had a disparate impact on women. Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 705;
Beard, 656 F. Supp. at 1468-69. The courts rejected the claim, in part, because any
disparate impact on women caused by the use of market forces was not caused solely by
the employer's use of that factor, but also by social forces (the forces setting the market
wages). Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 708-09; Beard, 656 F. Supp. at 1469-70. The courts held
that they were not competent to investigate those social forces and that employers should
not be held liable because of them. Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 705-09; Beard, 656 F. Supp. at
1468-70.
This result is contrary to the blinders principle inherent in Griggs. In that case, the
court did not inquire into the social factors that may have contributed to the disparate
impact that the high school diploma requirement produced, but it held the employer liable
nonetheless. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-32. The comparable worth cases also blind
themselves to the societal forces, but use their blindness to exculpate employers, rather
than to find them liable. Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 705-09; Beard, 656 F. Supp. at 1468-70.
The comparable worth cases should be viewed as an exception to the ordinary
principles that apply to disparate impact cases. They are sex-based wage discrimination
cases subject to a particular provision of Title VII, the Bennett Amendment, that applies
only to them and that affects the disparate impact analysis only in that narrow class of
cases. Title VII, § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)(1988). See County of Washington v.
Gunther, 452 U.S. 161,167-68 (1981); American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716,723
(7th Cir. 1986). Moreover, "comparable worth" cases have been particularly controversial
and, hence, have tended to bend the antidiscrimination principles applied in more run-of-
the-mill cases. See STEVEN L. WILLBORN, A SECRETARY AND A COOK 127-36 (1989).
94. Professor Abrams has recently commented perceptively on this function of the
disparate impact model, i.e., that it serves as "a link between discrimination in the
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Blinders also affect the disparate impact model in ordinary cases
because the model does not require further exploration of any of the
causes of a disparate impact to determine whether they, in turn, have
been produced by purposeful discrimination. The plaintiff need not
prove (1) that the employer selected the high school diploma
requirement for the purpose of disproportionately eliminating black
candidates,95 nor (2) that the social conditions producing a lower
proportion of black than white high school graduates were the result
of any purposeful racial discrimination." Similarly, the employer
cannot defend by presenting evidence that its purposeful
discrimination produced no disparity. For purposes of the prima facie
case, the plaintiff need prove only that the employment criterion
produced the disproportionate screening effect in a relevant
workplace and in the larger social world." Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the Complex
Female Subject, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2479,2524 (1994). Although we do not engage in a full
comparison here, we want to note some ways in which our analysis adds to that of
Professor Abrams and some ways in which we disagree with her analysis. Our analysis
supplements Professor Abrams's by highlighting the irony of the link disparate impact
provides between workplace and societal discrimination: The link occurs not because the
model attends to societal discrimination, but because it ignores it. Professor Abrams hints
that the disparate impact model is designed to minimize the perpetuation of past
discrimination and that the model has been marginalized. Id. at 2524-26. We disagree
with both points. See infra parts III.B, III.C.
95. The irrelevance of purposeful employer discrimination is a central principle of the
disparate impact model and a part of the mantra recited by the courts in virtually every
disparate impact case. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328 (1977) (noting
that a disparate impact claim "does not involve an assertion of purposeful discriminatory
motive"); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.15 (1977)
(stating that "[p]roof of discriminatory motive... is not required under disparate-impact
theory"); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (stating that "good intent
or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing
mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to
measuring job capability").
96. Some commentators have suggested that inquiry into external discrimination
should be a part of the model's proof structure, particularly when it is applied under the
Constitution. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive:
Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 36, 50-55 (1977); Perry, supra
note 6, at 557-61. Those suggestions, however, have never been followed. Under the
Constitution, the disparate impact model itself has been rejected, thus rendering the
inquiries unnecessary. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 281 (1979) (holding
that a preference for veterans with a disparate impact against women did not violate the
Constitution); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245-46 (1976) (holding that a test with
a disparate impact against black police officer applicants did not violate the Constitution).
When the disparate impact model is applied under antidiscrimination statutes, the courts
have structured the proof process to focus on the effect of the employer's criterion
independent of other causal factors, thus making inquiry into external discrimination
irrelevant. See supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.
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population differentiated by protected group status.97  Richer
conceptions of causation (for example, ones that inquire into the
social processes or subjective motivations that produce the disparity)
are not only unnecessary, they are irrelevant.
Causation is also blindered in ordinary disparate impact cases
because it does not require that the plaintiff prove that the employer's
criterion has actually produced a disparate impact in the workplace.
In Griggs, for example, the same disparate impact on blacks may have
occurred even if the employer had not utilized the high school
diploma requirement. Employees applying for the jobs at issue in
Griggs also had to attain a certain score on a general "intelligence"
test that approximated the national median score for high school
graduates.9" Blacks as a class may have suffered from the same (or
even a greater) disparate impact as a result of the test requirement.99
The disparate impact model as applied in Griggs, then, did not require
any proof that the criterion at issue actually produced a disparate
impact;1"° it merely required proof that the criterion at issue would
have screened out protected class members disproportionately if
applied independently of any other factors at play in the selection
process.10
This view of Griggs sheds light on the concurrence lens. If we
look only at the high school diploma requirement, the lower propor-
tion of blacks than whites with a diploma tends to indicate that the
97. Another way of saying this is that the employer can be liable even if its
employment criterion is not a necessary cause of the disparity. The employment criterion
need only be sufficient to produce the outcome, if operating jointly with other causes.
Inquiry into those other causes, however, is not a part of the analysis.
98. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 427-28 (1971).
99. We provide examples of this point below. See infra notes 103-15 and accom-
panying text.
100. Proof of actual effect is neither a part of the plaintiff's prima facie case, nor a
cognizable employer defense. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 450-51 (1982)
(holding that an employer cannot defend by proving that other employment practices
tended to eliminate disparate impact caused by an employment test).
101. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430 & n.6. The principal reason for this result is that courts,
following the Supreme Court's lead in Griggs, do not inquire into whether other factors
make the effects of the questioned factor redundant for individuals affected by the
questioned factor. The "particular employment practice" requirement of Title VII also
implies the result. Title VII, § 703(k)(1)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. V
1993). A different result would require inquiry beyond the "particular" criterion to other
factors simultaneously in play in the selection process, to see how the interplay of factors
would affect individuals. Finally, this result is implied by Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S.
440, 445-56 (1982), which held that an employment practice with a disparate impact on
some individuals is not immunized because other factors at play in the workplace eliminate
the impact for other individuals.
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requirement disproportionately disadvantages blacks. In this
particular workplace, however, it may be that other criteria at play
(such as the test requirement) also screen out blacks dispropor-
tionately, so that the net effect of the high school diploma re-
quirement is zero, or perhaps even favorable to blacks. Griggs's
unwillingness to consider the net effect of the high school diploma
with the test requirement does not, surprisingly, rule out simultaneous
consideration of the two criteria (i.e., the concurrence lens). That is
because the net effect of a criterion examines its redundant effect on
individuals within the protected class-i.e., it considers whether the
same individuals would have been excluded anyway, due to other
criteria at work. The concurrence lens assesses the joint effect of two
or more criteria on the class as a whole-i.e., it allows for the
possibility that a joint impact may occur whether the same or different
individuals are excluded by the criteria independently.1' Absence
of a net effect of one criterion on members of the protected class does
not imply that the criterion, considered together with other criteria,
does not have a joint effect on some individuals within the class.
The blindered treatment of causation brought into focus by the
concurrence lens emphasizes the somewhat counterintuitive emphasis
of the disparate impact model on providing protection for individuals
rather than groups. It can also produce anomalous outcomes. To
illustrate, assume first that the high school diploma requirement in
Griggs was not business justified but that the tests were, °3 and that
the two requirements were precisely redundant in their racial impact
(that is, everyone who passed the tests had a high school diploma and
102. Recall that the concurrent effect of two criteria may be better, worse, or the same
as the effect of either criterion considered independently. See supra notes 20-25 and
accompanying text.
103. In Griggs itself, neither the high school diploma requirement nor the test
requirement was business justified. Thus, the disparate impact was overdetermined in a
way analogous to the well-known causation hypotheticals in which "[t]wo men may
simultaneously fire and lodge a bullet in their victim's brain, or may simultaneously
approach an escaping gas with a lighted candle." H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORP,
CAUSATION IN THE LAW 123 (2d ed. 1985). The causation problem of deciding whom to
hold responsible is not present here, however, because the same actor is responsible for
both forces. A different problem is present though. In the disparate impact context, the
two factors may adversely affect different groups of people. If each factor has a disparate
impact and neither is business justified, as in Griggs, any plaintiff (or class member)
adversely affected by either factor should be entitled to a remedy. This result follows from
our discussion of the appropriate result when one of the factors is business justified. See
infra notes 108-13 and accompanying text.
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everyone who failed the tests did not). Table 10 illustrates this
formalized situation:1' 4
TABLE 10: APPLICATION OF THE DISPARATE IMPACT MODEL WITH
PERFECTLY REDUNDANT JOB REQUIREMENTS
High School Diploma
Yes No
Pass Black 50 Black 0
White 80 White 0
Tests
Fail Black 0 Black 50
White 0 White 20
In this situation, the high school diploma requirement could be
successfully attacked using the disparate impact model even though
the requirement would not actually affect any black person. The high
school diploma requirement, analyzed independently of the test
requirement, has a cognizable disparate impact against blacks"°5 and,
104. Note a couple of things about this situation. First, two perfectly redundant
requirements, where one can be justified and the other cannot, are hard to imagine.
Indeed, if one requirement is justified and the other correlates with it perfectly in the sense
of excluding the same individuals, the other is probably business justified, too. This need
not be the case, however; one requirement could fail to be business justified, yet for this
employer's relevant population, each of the two requirements would exclude precisely the
same people. For example, a test that is not valid-and hence not business jus-
tified-could exclude precisely the same people as a business justified high school diploma
requirement. Test validation procedures are discussed in Richard R. Reilly, Validating
Employee Selection Procedures, in STATISTICAL METHODS IN DISCRIMINATION
LITIGATION 133 (H. Kaye & Mikel Aickin eds., 1986). A discussion of the legal and social
science issues involved in relying on test validation for determining business necessity can
be obtained from Mark Kelman, Concepts of Discrimination in "General Ability" Job
Testing, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1157 (1991); Frank L. Schmidt, The Problem of Group
Differences in Ability Test Scores in Employment Selection, 33 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 272
(1988). We use the situation here not to imply that it is likely to occur, but as an extreme
case with which to begin our discussion.
Second, the appropriate legal treatment of the concurrence of employer selection
criteria has not yet been discussed. We suggest a resolution of those legal issues later. See
infra part IV.A.
105. The pass rate for blacks and whites is 50% and 80% respectively, which means
that the selection ratio is 50/80 = .625. That selection ratio is less than .80, so it satisfies
the four-fifths rule requirement for the existence of a disparate impact.
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by assumption, is not business justified. The analysis focuses on the
individual effect of the high school diploma requirement and blinds
itself to its actual effect on blacks in the particular workplace." 6
Therefore, the blindered nature of causation in disparate impact cases
means that the requirement has a cognizable disparate impact and,
therefore, that use of the requirement is improper.
The actual effect of the requirement, however, can play a role at
a later stage of a disparate impact case. For example, the employer
could demonstrate the absence of actual effects to avoid liability to
individual class members. As in other types of discrimination cases,
at the remedy stage, the employer would be individually liable only
to class members who were actually adversely affected by the
employer's improper actions (here, by its use of the high school
diploma requirement)."° Thus, in our example, the employer would
106. That is, the analysis blinds itself to the manner in which the other criteria in play
at the workplace (in our example, the test requirement) affect the impact of the high
school diploma requirement on blacks. In our example, the other criterion eliminates the
same individuals as the high school diploma, and in this sense, would seem to eliminate
the adverse impact of the high school diploma requirement on blacks. Jointly, however,
a disparate impact on blacks remains, as seen through the concurrence lens. Here, the
concurrent effect of the two requirements is precisely the same as the effect of each
requirement applied independently of the other. Once again, concurrence does not
concern itself with whether multiple criteria affect the same individuals, but with whether
the group as a whole suffers an impact as the result of imposition of two or more selection
criteria. Therefore, concurrence is particularly relevant to causation in disparate impact
analysis. As long as any individuals are disproportionately affected due to their class
membership, an impact exists.
107. The closest analogy is to the remedy stage of a systemic disparate treatment class
action. Plaintiffs who make out a successful systemic disparate treatment case have
created a presumption of illegal discrimination and, hence, in favor of individual relief.
The employer, however, has an opportunity to avoid providing relief to any individual class
member by proving that the member has not suffered from the presumptive discrimination
(e.g., by proving that other legitimate reasons would have resulted in the same
employment outcome). International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
357-62 (1977); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 772-73 (1976).
The analysis is also suggested by the "mixed motives" analysis of Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 237-58 (1989) and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Title VII, §§
703(m), 706(g)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1993). Even
when a plaintiff can establish that discrimination was a factor motivating the employer, the
employer can avoid individual relief if it can prove that it would have taken the same
adverse action in the absence of the impermissible factor.
Although much less commonly applied, this same principle is applicable in disparate
impact cases. Although the plaintiff's successful disparate impact case creates a
presumption of discrimination against every individual class member, the employer has an
opportunity to avoid individual relief by proving that other legitimate reasons would have
resulted in the same employment outcome. See Davis v. City of Dallas, 748 F. Supp. 1165,
1169-77 (N.D. Tex. 1990) (noting that an employer can avoid individual relief in a
disparate impact case by demonstrating that individual class members do not meet other
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be liable only to class members who did not have a high school
diploma and who passed the test, a null set.
Now assume that one black person in Table 10 moves from the
Pass-Yes box to the Pass-No box, so now forty-nine black persons
both passed the test and had a high school diploma and one black
person passed the test but did not have a high school diploma.
Everything else remains the same (see Table 11). The high school
diploma requirement now has a net adverse effect on one out of one
hundred black persons compared to none out of one hundred white
persons." s
legitimate employment criteria); Richardson v. Lamar County Bd. of Educ., 729 F. Supp.
806, 813-14 (M.D. Ala. 1989), aff'd sub nom. Richardson v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ.,
935 F.2d 1240 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding that employer did not meet burden of proving that
individual would not have been rehired even if criterion with illegal disparate impact had
not been used). Cf. Pamela L. Perry, Two Faces of Disparate Impact Discrimination, 59
FORDHAM L. REv. 523, 567-70 (1991) (discussing briefly the individual and aggregate
natures of disparate impact model).
Our textual hypothetical provides an extreme example of this principle. The high
school diploma requirement has a disparate impact. Thus, its use is improper and should
be enjoined. The employer, however, can prove that the criterion has not adversely
affected any individual class member; each would have received the same treatment even
if the employer had not used illegal criterion. Thus, the employer is not liable to any
individual class member.
108. Determining the appropriate population here is problematic: Is the appropriate
population for analyzing the high school diploma requirement all 200 applicants, or only
those who meet the employer's other requirement (the test)? In the text, we implicitly
argue that the appropriate population is all 200 black and white applicants. If that is
correct, then the overall selection rates of the high school diploma requirement are 49 out
of 100 (.49) for blacks and 80 out of 100 (.80) for whites, for a selection ratio of .6125
(.49/.80), suggesting that a disparate impact on blacks exists. It could be argued, however,
that the appropriate population consists only of those who remain after the tests. If one
looks at that population, the selection rates are 49 out of 50 (.98) for blacks and 80 out of
80 (1.00) for whites. The selection ratio of .98 for that population does not suggest a
disparate impact. The problem with the latter population is that the test and diploma
requirements, by assumption, are applied simultaneously so it is difficult to know which
requirement to look at first. Thus, the former population is more appropriate. See supra
part II.C.2.
The basic point here, however, is that the net effect of the high school diploma
requirement is very small. That is true for this hypothetical regardless of the proper
population. As the text indicates, if the population is all applicants, the high school
diploma requirement alone rejects only 1 out of 100 blacks and none out of 100 whites.
If the population is only those applicants who meet the test requirement, the diploma
requirement rejects 1 out of 50 blacks and none out of 80 whites. In either event, the net
effect of the diploma requirement is very minimal.
1996] DECONSTRUCTING DISPARATE IMPACT 361
TABLE 11: APPLICATION OF THE DISPARATE IMPACT MODEL WITH
CLOSE-TO-REDUNDANT JOB REQUIREMENTS
High School Diploma
Yes No
Pass Black 49 Black 1
White 80 White 0
Tests
Fail Black 0 Black 50
White 0 White 20
Nevertheless, despite this limited adverse effect, the high school
diploma requirement is illegal. The plaintiff can establish a disparate
impact based on the overall effect of the requirement. 9 and, by
assumption, the employer cannot demonstrate business necessity. The
one black person in the Pass-No box would be entitled to
damages."0 This result is analogous to that in Connecticut v.
Teal,"' in which the Supreme Court stated that individual blacks
were entitled to protection under the disparate impact model even
though the evidence indicated that blacks as a group had not suffered
any disadvantage in the employer's selection process."' Similarly
in this hypothetical, blacks as a group have not suffered any cog-
nizable injury because of the high school diploma requirement;" 3
109. The adverse effect of the diploma requirement is marginally greater in this
hypothetical. Now 49 (instead of 50) out of 100 black persons (.49) can meet the
requirement compared to 80 out of 100 white persons (.80). Thus, the selection ratio for
the prior hypothetical was .625 (.50/.80), while here the selection ratio is .6125 (.49/.80).
110. See supra note 107.
111. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
112. Id. at 452-56. Cases other than Teal also emphasize the individual nature of Title
VII's protections. See, e.g., Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579 (1978); City
of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978); Phillips v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (per curiam). None of these cases, of
course, is directly on point. Teal considers a bottom line issue, rather than a concurrence
issue, see supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text, while Manhart, Furnco, and Phillips
are disparate treatment rather than disparate impact cases.
113. Given that the tests are used to screen out blacks, the high school diploma
requirement has not produced any additional impact on the group of blacks as a whole.
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nevertheless, any individual blacks who have been disadvantaged are
entitled to relief
The blindered treatment of causation in disparate impact cases,
and its concomitant focus on individuals, can produce anomalous
outcomes. Assume that the one black person in the Pass-No box is
joined by 10 white persons (Table 12). Since the standard treatment
of causation requires us to ignore the effects of the tests, here we can
make out a case of disparate impact discrimination against blacks.
The high school diploma requirement produces a selection rate of .49
for blacks and .70 for whites, for a selection ratio of .70. By as-
sumption, the requirement cannot be justified. As a result, use of the
requirement is improper and the black person in the Pass-No box
would be entitled to relief. This is true even though the net effect of
the high school diploma requirement operates in favor of blacks as a
group. Only one of one hundred blacks is actually adversely affected
by the high school diploma requirement, compared to ten of one
hundred whites."4 As a group, blacks would prefer that the high
school diploma requirement be left in place because it increases the
proportion of blacks in the pool available for hire from .385 to
.412.115
TABLE 12: APPLICATION OF THE DISPARATE IMPACT MODEL WITH
REVERSED OVERALL AND NET EFFECTS
High School Diploma
Yes No
Pass Black 49 Black 1
White 70 White 10
Tests
Fail Black 0 Black 50
White 0 White 20
114. Obviously, this hypothetical presents the same population problem as the previous
one. See supra note 108.
115. Without the high school diploma requirement, 50 blacks and 80 whites pass the
tests and are available for hire (50/130 = .385). With the high school diploma requirement,
49 blacks and 70 whites meet both requirements and are available for hire (49/119 = .412).
We believe the limited role for causation in disparate impact cases is justified even
though it produces anomalies like these. See infra part III.C.
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These blindered interpretations of causation are also present in
disparate impact cases more complex than Griggs. Consider the most
famous of these cases: Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio."6
Plaintiffs in Wards Cove attempted to demonstrate that a set of
employment practices had a disparate impact on nonwhites through
evidence that a lower proportion of nonwhites were in favorable non-
cannery jobs than in unfavorable cannery jobs."7 Although the
Supreme Court had other problems with the court of appeals'
decision,' the Court's discussion of causation focused only on the
fact that the plaintiffs had not isolated the particular employment
practices that produced the disparity of nonwhites in non-cannery and
cannery jobs."9 Plaintiffs alleged that the employer used several
employment practices (e.g., nepotism, separate hiring channels, and
rehire preferences), but they did not disentangle the extent to which
each contributed (or failed to contribute) to the disparityY° If the
plaintiffs could have proved that a particular employment practice
"caused" the disparity (or a significant enough portion of it), they
would have met the Supreme Court's articulated causation re-
quirement.
Nothing in Wards Cove indicates that the causation requirement
articulated there is different from the one implicitly applied in Griggs.
The plaintiffs in Griggs also had to demonstrate that particular
employment practices caused a disparity.'2' The difference between
Wards Cove and Griggs is that the plaintiffs in Wards Cove did not
have evidence of the particular screening effect of each (or indeed
any) of the employment practices used by the employer."2 The
plaintiffs attempted to establish the screening effect indirectly based
116. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
117. Id. at 650.
118. The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals had erred by failing to account
properly for qualifications when it made its group comparisons. Id. at 650-55. The Court
also commented on the proper allocation of burdens of proof at the business necessity
stage of a disparate impact case. Id. at 656-61.
119. Id. at 656-58.
120. Id. at 647-48, 656-58.
121. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-31 & n.6 (1971).
122. One reason for this was that the requirements in Griggs were generic, in the sense
that their effects could be determined based on evidence extrinsic to the particular
employer involved. In Wards Cove, the employment practices were such that any
disparate impact could only be demonstrated based on that particular employer's
experience. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 656-58. For example, any disparate impact caused
by the employer's nepotism would depend on factors peculiar to the employer such as the
number of relatives who apply, their race, and so forth.
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on the employer's hiring pattern,1  but that pattern reflected the
combined effect of multiple screening criteria used by the employer
and the plaintiffs could not adequately isolate the effects of individual
criteria. Nothing in Wards Cove suggests that the disparate impact
model requires inquiries into the social factors that cause disparities
in conjunction with employment practices or into subjective
motivations contributing to disparities, or that the employment
practices have to produce job losses in the particular workplace
independently of any other employment practices used by the
employer.
In summary, the causation element in ordinary disparate impact
cases is a rather meager and curious concept. The plaintiff need only
isolate the criterion at issue from other criteria used by the employer
and demonstrate that it screens out a disproportionate number of
protected class members in a relevant population. Proof that might
normally be thought relevant to causation is not relevant in disparate
impact cases: proof that the screening effect is caused primarily not
by the criterion at issue, but by factors external to the employer;
proof that the screening effect was not produced by purposeful
discrimination against the class either by the employer or by anyone
else; and proof that the same screening effect would have occurred
even if the employer had not used the criterion at all. Moreover,
proof of these points is irrelevant regardless of who presents it-it is
neither a part of the plaintiff's burden, nor a cognizable defense if
presented by the employer.
B. Blindered Causation and the Nature of "Ordinary" Disparate
Impact Cases
Blindered causation is not merely an important and interesting
aspect of the disparate impact model. It is the defining characteristic
of the model and it is the element that makes the model a distinct and
powerful feature on the antidiscrimination landscape. This is true not
only in a formalistic and obvious sense, but also in a deeper sense that
123. Id. at 650. Wards Cove does not foreclose the possibility that a disparate impact
can be proved in this way. If (1) cannery jobs were the appropriate population for
considering the effect of screening criteria for entry into non-cannery jobs (an assumption
that the Court specifically rejected in Wards Cove, id at 651-55) and (2) the plaintiffs
could show that a single employment criterion produced a disparity in the minority
representation rates between cannery and non-cannery jobs (a multitude of factors
contributed to the disparity in Wards Cove), then the difference in representation rates at-
tributable to the single factor could easily be converted into a difference in selection rates
and one would have the type of comparison used in Griggs.
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has important substantive implications. Moreover, this insight permits
us to bring into better focus the other elements of the disparate
impact model.
In a formalistic sense, blindered causation is the defining feature
of the disparate impact model."2 The most obvious way in which
causation is blindered is that it is oblivious to the employer's
intent." At a simple and formalistic level, this is the principal
distinction between the two major types of discrimination. The
judicial definition of disparate treatment discrimination, repeated
mantra-like in case after case, 6 is that it occurs when an employer
intends to discriminate. The equivalent judicial definition of disparate
impact discrimination, also repeated mantra-like, is that it does not
require any showing of adverse employer intention. 27
Even at this simplistic level, blindered causation has consequences
that highlight the importance of the blindness principle. In treatment
cases, evidence of a disparate impact is relevant. Indeed, evidence of
a severe disparate impact may, by itself, be sufficient to prove the
type of adverse intention that is the core of a treatment case.' 2  The
converse is not true. In disparate impact cases, evidence of employer
intent, one way or the other, is completely irrelevant.'29 The
disparate impact model is blind to that type of causation.
124. We focus in this section on the distinction between the two major models of
discrimination, disparate treatment and disparate impact. Although we do not focus on
it here, we believe that the blindered nature of causation is also the principal way of
distinguishing the disparate impact model from other models of discrimination, such as the
emerging harassment and reasonable accommodation models.
125. See supra note 95.
126. See United States Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,715 (1983) (noting that the
factual issue in a disparate treatment case is whether "the defendant intentionally
discriminated against the plaintiff"); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (holding that plaintiff bears burden of proving that "the defendant
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff"); Intimational Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (stating that " '[d]isparate treatment' . . . is
the most easily understood type of discrimination. ... Proof of discriminatory motive is
critical"). We do not mean to disparage this practice of the courts. Indeed, the vast
majority of cases depend on analysis that is no more refined than the mantras we recite
here. Our intent is merely to emphasize that, even at this superficial level, blindered
causation is a central feature of the disparate impact model and that it has important
consequences.
127. See supra note 95.
128. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66
(1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,242 (1976). Note that in severe cases, plaintiffs
have incentives to attempt to fit their cases into the disparate treatment category because
of remedial differences between the two models. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981A (Supp. V 1993)
(compensatory and punitive damages available for disparate treatment cases only).
129. See supra note 95.
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Blindered causation is also the defining feature of the disparate
impact model because it is what links the model to a conception of
discrimination. The other major components of the model (the
"particular employment practice" and "business necessity"
elements)13 ° do not create any tie between challenged practices and
discrimination. Blindered causation defines the crucial link necessary
to create a legal inference that the employment practices are
discriminatory. Blindered causation is the defining feature of the
model, then, because it transforms the model from one designed to
isolate non-business-related practices (with no resulting legal
consequences) into one designed to isolate instances of legally
significant discrimination.
Finally, blindered causation is the defining feature of the disparate
impact model because it is what gives the model its independent
power. The model has independent power only when the disparate
treatment model would not produce a finding of discrimination in the
same circumstances.131  Consider a wage discrimination case in
which the plaintiffs allege that the employer discriminates against
women.13' Assume that the plaintiffs prove that the average salary of
female employees at the company is lower than the average salary of
male employees. No court would find that the plaintiffs had
established a prima facie case of disparate treatment discrimination.
Instead, plaintiffs would be required to refine the data to account for
important criteria that might produce this disparity in salaries. For
example, plaintiffs might have to include consideration of types of job
duties that the employer has assigned (to account for concurrence
possibilities) or levels of education of the employees (to account for
130. We argue later that these other elements of the disparate impact model are best
viewed as necessary constraints on the power the model otherwise would have because of
blindered causation. See infra notes 135-45 and accompanying text.
Note that we have largely ignored the final possible stage of a disparate impact
case-the plaintiff's opportunity to prove that an alternative employment practice would
have served the employer's business interests with a lesser disparate impact. See Title VII,
§ 703(k)(1)(A)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii) (Supp. V 1993); Albemarle Paper Co.
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). We view this element not as an integral part of
disparate impact cases, but rather as a post-impact stage in which the plaintiff is attempting
to prove disparate treatment. In any event, this stage is seldom reached.
131. Note, once again, that as a general matter, if plaintiffs can make out a claim under
both models, they should prefer disparate treatment because of its remedial advantages.
See supra note 128.
132. Note that we have selected a situation in which the courts have been very reluctant
to apply the disparate impact model. See supra note 93. We have done that intentionally
to emphasize both the differences between the two models and the power of the disparate
impact model.
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stratification possibilities).'33 In other words, plaintiffs are required
to account for concurrence and stratification to establish a disparate
treatment claim. A disparity in average salaries is not sufficient
because plaintiffs are making a comparison across employer-induced
categories (such as jobs) or across a heterogeneous population (such
as one in which individuals have different levels of education).
Plaintiffs must account for those possibilities to ensure that the
inference of intentional sex discrimination is based on a comparison
of men and women who are reasonably alike."
The disparate impact model is powerful because blindered
causation imposes severe limits 135 on the relevance of concurrence
and stratification in making discrimination determinations. Assume
in our wage discrimination example that the disparate impact model
applies and that its other requirements are met.136  The plaintiffs
have made out a prima facie disparate impact case by proving that the
employer's wage-setting practices have produced the average salary
133. Here we are assuming that the employer does not use level of education as a job
requirement, because we are using education level as a possible stratification variable. If
the employer were using level of education as a job requirement, its inclusion would
exemplify concurrence, not stratification. See supra parts II.A and H.B.
134. Note that we are not making a point about burdens of proof here. Our point,
instead, is that accounting for concurrence and stratification is relevant and important in
disparate treatment cases. The point would be equally strong if plaintiffs could make out
a prima facie case based on average salaries, but defendants were permitted to defend by
relying on studies of concurrence and stratification.
Plaintiffs need not produce perfect statistical models to satisfy the prima facie
disparate treatment showing; imperfect statistical showings may still be relevant evidence
of disparate treatment discrimination. The Supreme Court has indicated that "failure to
include variables will affect the analysis' probativeness, not its admissibility." Bazemore
v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400 (1986) (per curiam) (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
However, some models may be so incomplete that they can be inadmissible on grounds
of irrelevance. Id. at 400 n.10 (Brennan, J., concurring in part). Presumably, a model that
looks only at average salaries for men and women without consideration of concurrence
or stratification variables could be inadmissible on relevancy grounds. Certainly, it would
be insufficient to establish a prima facie disparate treatment case. See, eg., Eastland v.
Tennessee Valley Auth., 704 F.2d 613, 625 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1066
(1984) (affirming lower court determination that a salary discrimination claim failed
because plaintiffs failed to control adequately for relevant variables); cf. Case 109188,
Handels-og Kontorfunktionwrernes Forbund i Danmark v. Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening,
1989 E.C.R. 3199,3199 (holding that a difference in average pay between men and women
gives rise to a presumption that the system of job classification is not free from sex
discrimination).
135. We discuss the precise nature of these limits infra part IV.
136. This is a large assumption. First, the "particular employment practice"
requirement, see infra part IV.A.1, will likely not be met. Second, the disparate impact
model has limited application to wage cases. See American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783
F.2d 716, 722-23 (7th Cir. 1986).
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difference between male and female employees. 137  Blindered
causation means that plaintiffs do not need to stratify to account for
societal factors (such as educational differences) that may have
contributed to the disparity,138 nor do they need to account for
concurrence possibilities (such as differences in jobs held)., Nor
is it likely that the employer can defend by presenting evidence of
concurrence or stratification."4  The disparate impact model is
powerful because blindered causation precludes the use of evidence
which, if available, may well undermine a disparate treatment
claim.
141
The centrality of blindered causation to the disparate impact
model allows us to bring into better focus the other elements of the
model. As our wage-setting example illustrates, the disparate impact
model's conception of causation is extremely powerful. Without
constraints, the model would articulate a strong equal achievement
conception of equality: Equality is achieved when each racial group
receives its proportionate share of the economic pie.14 1 Men and
137. Notice that this prima facie showing of disparate impact has a different
quantitative nature than the showings discussed previously. See supra part II. In previous
examples, the employment-related decisionmaking involved dichotomous outcomes (e.g.,
hire or not hire, promote or not promote). Here, the example involves level of salary,
which is continuous in nature. Selection rates are not immediately applicable to this latter
type of case, so that application of the four-fifths rule becomes problematic. Nonetheless,
statistical procedures can be used so that statistical evidence regarding the significance of
salary differences between men and women is available and probative.
138. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 98-106.
140. We discuss later the narrow situations in which concurrence and stratification
evidence is relevant in disparate impact cases. See infra part IV.
141. This is the power, through blindered causation of the disparate impact model, that
informs our proposed legal treatment of the concurrence and stratification lenses. Thus,
the use of concurrence and stratification should be limited to the extent that they
undermine this power. When they enhance the power, however, by amplifying
discrimination that would otherwise not be visible, different treatment of the lenses is
warranted. Part IV, infra, discusses these issues extensively.
142. Cox, supra note 6, at 46. Several commentators have argued that the "equal
achievement" conception of equality provides the underlying rationale for the disparate
impact model. See Alfred W. Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power
Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MIcH. L. REv. 59, 66-89 (1972);
Fiss, supra note 6, at 237-49. The argument is not convincing for a number of reasons.
As indicated below, the features of the model other than causation (the "particular
employment practice" and "business necessity" elements) tend to undermine the ability
of the model to produce equal outcomes; the disparate impact model does not address
disproportionate shares produced by multiple employment practices or by criteria that are
justified by business necessity. Moreover, blindered causation itself tends to undermine
the argument. If equal achievement is the model's goal, bottom line equality should be
a defense to a disparate impact claim and bottom line inequality should state a claim.
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women in our example would have to be paid "equally" even if the
difference in average salaries was attributable to societal factors
(differences in educational level) or to legitimate employer dis-
tinctions (differences in jobs held). The blindered nature of the
model's conception of causation means that that portion of the model
is relatively unconstrained-differences equal cognizable
discrimination. Attempts to explain away the differences by accoun-
ting for concurrence or stratification are quite limited.
The other principal elements of the disparate impact model are
best viewed as constraints on the model's power. The "particular
employment practice" requirement has very little to do with
discrimination directly,43 but it does function to limit the range of
the model's attack. The model is restricted to "particular" practices
and cannot normally be used to attack a combination of practices,"
such as the combination of wage-setting practices producing the salary
disparity in our example. Similarly, the "business necessity" re-
quirement has little to do with discrimination directly.45 The
business necessity requirement indicates that productivity concerns
limit pursuit of the "equal achievement" conception of equality.
Neither is the case. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988);
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 445-56 (1982). Similarly, the results indicated above for
situations in- which a difference exists between the overall and net effects of a criterion
would be quite different if equal achievement were the model's underlying rationale. See
supra notes 98-106. In sum, an equal achievement approach to equality would be
especially sensitive to the ultimate outcomes of employment processes, not blind to them.
143. Isolating a particular employment practice tells us virtually nothing about whether
that practice is or is not discriminatory in any relevant sense. The practice becomes
relevant to discrimination only if it is connected to discrimination in some way--only if it
is the product of intentional discrimination or if it has a disparate impact on a protected
group.
144. But see infra part IV.A.1.
145. Determining that a practice is or is not business justified tells us a little, but only
a little, about whether that practice is discriminatory. Practices without any business
justification are probably slightly more likely to be the product of discrimination (in either
an intent or impact sense) than practices with a business justification. Since business
reasons are absent, discrimination provides a plausible reason for the existence of non-
business justified practices; for business justified practices, a plausible reason for their
existence is present without indulging any inference of discrimination. But the inference
is weak. Practices with a business justification may well have been carefully selected
because they tend to screen out a particular protected group. Practices without a business
justification may well have been adopted for a variety of reasons having nothing to do with
discrimination, such as custom, ignorance, or thoughtlessness.
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C. Blindered Causation and the Underlying Rationale of the Disparate
Impact Model
Identifying the proper role of the disparate impact model in the
antidiscrimination effort has proved to be a difficult task. Earlier
attempts to identify the model's role have caused authors to utter
phrases such as a "theoretical vacuum" '146 and "a state of near
complete disarray."'47 The disparate impact model's treatment of
causation, however, provides insight into the model's proper role.
Causation in these cases (and in the law generally) is ultimately a
legal construct designed to accomplish certain goals.14 As a result,
our enhanced understanding of causation may help us to see more
clearly the goals the disparate impact model is designed to pursue. 49
Discussions of the purpose of the disparate impact model, and
indeed of fair employment laws generally, have concentrated on two
possible conceptions of equality. Professor Fiss provided an early
articulation of these conceptions in his influential article, A Theory of
Fair Employment Laws:
One [conception] is equal treatment. Individual Negroes
should be treated "equally" by employers in the sense that
their race should be "ignored," that is, not held against
them. This sense of equality focuses on the starting
positions in a race: If color is not a criterion for
employment, blacks will be on equal footing with whites.
The second sense of equality-"equal achievement"-looks
to the outcome of the race. It relates to the actual
distribution of jobs among racial classes .... Jobs should be
146. Steven L. Willborn, The Disparate Impact Model of Discrimination: Theory and
Limits, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 799, 801 (1985).
147. Cox, supra note 6, at 46.
148. Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry
Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CH. L. REV. 69, 105-08 (1975).
149. Ordinarily, we prefer to think that our goals inform and shape our legal
conceptions of causation. Here, because we know more about causation in disparate
impact cases than we do about the goals of the model, we are looking in the opposite
direction; we are attempting to inform and shape our understanding of the goals of the
model from its treatment of causation. This merely recognizes, as then-Professor Calabresi
did, that the relationship between causation and the goals of the law is complex. Causal
concepts are "responsive to echoes from the past," Calabresi, supra note 148, at 108, and,
hence, may shape the goals of the law in ways beyond the lawmakers' immediate
understanding. One would expect this to be true especially when the law develops
primarily through common-law processes, as was the case with the disparate impact model.
At the same time, however, we may find that when we improve our understanding of the
model's goals, we will want to revisit the model's conception of causation.
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distributed so that the relative economic position of
Negroes-as a class-is improved, so that the economic
position of Negroes is approximately equal to that of
whites. 50
Although illuminating on some issues, the dominance of these two
conceptions of equality has interfered with the search for the proper
role of the disparate impact model. We have already discussed why
the treatment of causation in impact cases makes it clear that the
model does not mesh well with the equal achievement conception of
equality.' Despite the claims of some commentators, 5 2 it does
not mesh well with the equal treatment conception of equality either.
The equal treatment conception of equality requires employers to
ignore race'53 when making employment decisions. The disparate
treatment model translates this conception of equality into legal
doctrine most directly: A plaintiff must prove that an employer did
not ignore race, but instead intentionally took race into consideration
when making employment decisions. Causation in disparate treat-
ment cases, then, is focused on whether intentional discrimination is
present (or, conversely, on whether employers have breached their
obligation to ignore race), rather than on the effects of an
employment criterion."
150. Owen Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Law, 38 U. CHi. L. REv. 235, 237-38
(1971). A third possible conception of equality considers the legacy of past discrimination.
People are treated equally if those who suffer from past discrimination are placed on an
equal footing with others. Commentators have regularly considered whether the disparate
impact model implements this conception of equality, both under Title VII and under the
Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 6, at 101-07; Eisenberg, supra note 96,
at 57-83; Perry, supra note 6, at 553-62.
The blindered treatment of causation, however, means that this conception of equality
is limited in its ability to rationalize the model. If the goal is to counter the adverse effects
of past discrimination, one would expect the model to pay attention to whether a disparate
impact is the product of past discrimination. But the model's treatment of causation
means that the model is blind to whether the impact is produced by past discrimination.
See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
152. See infra note 156.
153. We will use race as our example, but obviously fair employment laws also require
employers to ignore other protected statuses.
154. Although we are discussing causation issues here, this difference in focus is also
a primary distinction between treatment and impact cases and can have consequences for
the relevance of evidence. For example, evidence that a combination of employment
practices produces a lower proportion of blacks in a work force than one would expect
from the proportion of blacks in the application pool would be insufficient to establish a
disparate impact claim because it is inadequately focused on any individual employment
criterion, but it may be sufficient to create an inference of intentional discrimination.
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Despite this difference in focus, however, the disparate impact
model could still fit within the equal treatment conception of equality.
The effects of employment criteria are relevant to the issue of
whether the employer has intentionally used race in making
employment decisions. Intentional race discrimination should result
in various types of racial disparities; therefore, racial disparities are
well-recognized as evidence of intentional racial discrimination.155
This has led some commentators to argue that the role of the
disparate impact model is merely to overcome the conceptual and
practical difficulties of proving intentional discrimination. 6 The
model formalizes one method of proving intentional discrimination;
adverse effects plus no business necessity serve as a proxy for a direct
finding of intentional discrimination. The disparate impact model
thus fits within the equal treatment conception of equality because its
function is to approximate the results of disparate treatment models.
The blindered treatment of causation under the disparate impact
model, however, makes this explanation of its function very unsatis-
fying. If the goal is to approximate the results of intention-based
models, one would hardly expect the model to ignore
relevant-indeed, even conclusive-evidence of intent. But that is
what the blindered treatment of causation does. Evidence that a
disparity was caused in part by social conditions may well undermine
any inference that the employer caused the disparity intentional-
ly' 57-but such evidence is irrelevant for a disparate impact
claim.' Evidence that the employer selected a criterion for the
purpose of screening out blacks is crucial for an intent-based
model-but irrelevant for a disparate impact claim.'59 Evidence that
155. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977);
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977).
156. See Cox, supra note 6, at 108-17; Rutherglen, supra note 6, at 1299-1311. But see
Willborn, supra note 146, at 804-08 (arguing that treatment of disparate impact model as
an intent-based theory aggravates, rather than alleviates, the practical and conceptual
problems with proving intent).
157. Assume, for example, that an employer adopts an employment practice that has
a disparate impact on a protected group because of a set of social conditions that the
employer can demonstrate it was unaware of at the time it adopted the practice. This
would undermine any inference that the employer adopted the practice with an intention
to discriminate.
158. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text. Note that this list of factors follows
our discussion in the previous section. See supra notes 92-101 and accompanying text.
159. The employer's intention is irrelevant in a disparate impact claim even if it is an
intention to discriminate. Assume, for example, that the employer adopts a high school
diploma requirement with the intention of screening out blacks disproportionately, but he
is mistaken about the screening effect-the requirement actually screens out the same
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a criterion has a disparate impact when considered individually, but
no disparate screening effect when an employer used it in com-
bination with other criteria, would tend to undermine an intent-based
claim-but would be irrelevant to a disparate impact claim.
The equal treatment conception of discrimination, then, conflicts
with the disparate impact model's blindered treatment of causation.
Disparate treatment cases, which implement the equal treatment
conception most directly, permit a wide-ranging inquiry into all
potential causes of employment disparities (or other evidence of
adverse treatment) in an attempt to determine whether intentional
discrimination was a motivating factor.1" In contrast, impact cases
are blind to most potential causative factors and permit only a limited
inquiry into the actual effects of a particular employment practice.161
proportion of blacks and whites. No disparate impact claim could be made out because
the high school diploma requirement has no adverse impact on a protected group.
Presumably, the employer would still be liable for disparate treatment discrimination,
although designing an appropriate remedy would be problematic.
160. The causation distinction between the two theories has important practical
consequences. Consider, for example, the "lack of interest" argument in determining the
relevant population for measuring systemic disparate treatment or disparate impact. See
EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1315 (N.D. Ill. 1986), affd, 839 F.2d
302 (7th Cir. 1988); MARY JOE FRUG, POSTMODERN LEGAL FEMINISM 12-18 (1992); Vicki
Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work. Judicial Interpretations of Sex
Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1750, 1815-39 (1990). The argument is that, for various social reasons,
women lack interest in certain jobs and, as a result, should not be included in the
population for determining whether discrimination has occurred. If the case alleges
disparate treatment, the argument is sound. The goal is to determine whether this
employer "ignores" sex in making employment decisions; thus, women who decide not to
apply for jobs with the employer for reasons external to the employer should not be
included in the population. They are simply irrelevant to the issue of whether this
particular employer ignores or considers sex in making decisions. On the other hand, if
the case alleges disparate impact, the goal is not to determine whether a particular
employer ignores sex in making employment decisions, but rather to eliminate criteria that
have a disparate impact on women and that are not sufficiently related to the business.
Causation in disparate impact cases is blindered; therefore, we do not care whether the
disparate impact on women occurs because the employer intentionally selected the
criterion to eliminate women candidates or because of social forces external to the
employer. Consequently, "uninterested" women should be included in the population
when considering the disparate impact claim.
As previously noted, however, "interest" continues to be an important factor in
determining relevant populations in disparate impact cases. See supra part II.C.2. A full
criticism of determinations of the relevant population, although tangentially relevant to our
discussion, is beyond the scope of this Article.
161. Important commentators have missed this distinction between treatment and
impact cases and it has skewed their analysis. Professor Lamber, for example, wrongly
claimed that "comparative statistics express the basis" of the disparate impact model, while
"representation statistics form the essence" of the disparate treatment model. Julia
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To say that the disparate impact model "approximates" the disparate
treatment model does considerable violence to the normal notion of
approximation.
Blindered causation, however, is consistent with a role for the
disparate impact model. That role, harkening back to Griggs, is to
eliminate "artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to
employment."' 62 The model seeks to eliminate barriers that do not
further productivity concerns (are not "business justified") and that
operate to eliminate blacks disproportionately (have a "disparate
impact")."6' For two principal reasons, limiting the role of causation
in making the disparate impact determination furthers this anti-barrier
function, despite the anomalies it creates."M
First, the limited role for causation is efficient. Blindered
causation greatly simplifies disparate impact cases and, therefore,
should result in quicker and cheaper cases. The simplification is
obvious in several respects. First, the courts need not inquire into the
extent to which societal factors contribute to any adverse screening
Lamber, Discretionary Decisionmaking: The Application of Title VIi's Disparate Impact
Theory, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 869, 897; see also Cox, supra note 6, at 77-81. Because the
two types of statistics are convertible, they have virtually nothing to do with the underlying
basis of either theory. Similarly, Professor Lamber says that in a world with complete
information, the use of comparative or representation statistics should not matter.
Lamber, supra, at 896. Since Professor Lamber also claims that those statistics define the
essence of disparate impact and treatment discrimination, id. at 897, she implies that the
type of discrimination would not matter in a world of full information either. But, of
course, that is wrong. In a world of full information, we may know that an employment
criterion has a disparate impact on blacks and that the employer did not adopt the
criterion with discriminatory intent, or vice versa. The applicable model of discrimination
would matter.
162. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
163. Although our focus is different, our interpretation of the disparate impact model
is largely in agreement with that of Allen and her colleagues. Julie 0. Allen et al., A
Positive Theory of the Employment Discrimination Cases, 16 J. CORP. L. 173 (1991).
Allen's focus is on the relationship between the disparate impact and treatment models,
while ours is on proof of causation in disparate impact cases. Using our different lenses,
however, we both conclude that an anti-barrier rationale provides the best explanation of
the disparate impact model. See id. at 176-77. Despite this general agreement, we likely
disagree on some issues. We argue, for example, that a criterion with a disparate impact
should be enjoined even if it has no adverse effect on any individual. See supra note 107.
Allen's focus on the individual, rather than on the barrier, probably means that she would
not agree. Allen et al., supra, at 178.
Others who have discussed anti-barrier rationales have generally limited their notion
of barriers to those that are a consequence of past discrimination. See, e.g., Cox, supra
note 6, at 100-07; Fiss, supra note 6, at 302-04; Perry, supra note 6, at 555-62. That is a
much more limited notion of the anti-barrier rationale and one that does not square with
the blindered notion of causation used in disparate impact cases.
164. For a discussion of the anomalies, see supra part III.A.
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effects. Some of the proposed underlying theories for the disparate
impact model would necessitate inquiry into societal factors."6 But
those inquiries would be factually intense and the courts are very ill-
equipped as institutions to make them. The limited role for causation
permits courts to avoid these difficult inquiries. Second, the limited
role for causation means that the courts do not need to make difficult
inquiries into intent issues. The courts are institutionally equipped to
make these decisions (at least as equipped as any institution), but the
decisions are fraught with conceptual and practical difficulties."6
The limited role for causation means that the courts can avoid these
issues as well. Third, the limited role for causation means that the
courts need not disentangle the effects of all the employment criteria
used by particular employers to determine the net effects of a
particular criterion. The courts and litigants can instead focus on the
particular criterion at issue and, to a large extent, ignore other criteria
at play.
Efficiency arguments by themselves, of course, cannot justify the
limited role for causation. A rule that required courts to find for all
plaintiffs in disparate impact cases would be very efficient in terms of
court and litigant time and resources, but it would be very imprecise
in targeting employment criteria that screen inappropriately and are
not business justified. A second factor justifying blindered causation
is that it produces an acceptable level of precision. A number of
factors indicate this.
First, the causation requirement does require plaintiffs to isolate
the employment practice in question from other employment practices
and demonstrate that it results in a disparate screening effect in a
relevant population. Thus, even though somewhat limited, evidence
of causation is necessary to establish a prima facie case. 67 The
model does require evidence that the employment practice is linked
to protected status in a way that may disadvantage a protected group.
165. Most obviously, the theories citing past discrimination as the rationale for the
disparate impact model would require inquiries into societal discrimination. See, e.g.,
Eisenberg, supra note 96, at 62-79; Fiss, supra note 6, at 302-03; Perry, supra note 6, at
555-62.
166. See, e.g., Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of
Unconstitutional Legislative Motivation, 1971 SUP. Cr. REV. 95 passim; John Hart Ely,
Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1212-
17 (1970); Fiss, supra note 6, at 297-99.
167. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656-58 (1989).
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Second, situations in which there is a disjunction between the
overall and net effects of a criterion" are likely to be fairly limited.
Non-blindered causation would result in a search for such disjunctions
in most. cases. The costs of searching for such disjunctions may
outweigh the benefits of dealing with the anomalies that result in the
few cases in which such disjunctions exist.
Third, the costs of any resulting imprecisions would be low in any
event because the disparate impact model applies only to conduct of
low value. A disparate impact violation requires two basic deter-
minations: (1) a criterion causes a disproportionate screening effect
and (2) the criterion is not business justified. The causation element
goes only to the first determination and, even if causation is found
when it should not be, it will result in the invalidation of a criterion
only if it is found not to be business justified. Thus, the only criteria
at risk are criteria of low social value: Criteria that are not "job
related for the position in question and consistent with business
necessity. '
Fourth, the blindered treatment of causation means that causation
focuses on employment criteria operating as barriers rather than on
who or what is ultimately responsible for the impact. That is, the high
school diploma requirement in Griggs operated disproportionately as
a barrier to the employment of blacks, even if the employer was not
solely responsible for the adverse impact caused by the requirement.
Societal discrimination in educational opportunity may have been
primarily responsible for the adverse impact in some ultimate sense,
but the focus of the disparate impact model is not on isolating such
168. See supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
169. Title VII, § 703(k)(1)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. V 1993). Note
that the strength or weakness of this part of the argument depends on the degree of
precision of the business necessity determination. If the business necessity determination
is precise, so that all criteria found improper under the disparate impact model have no
value in predicting enhanced productivity, this argument is very strong. On the other
hand, if the business necessity determination is very imprecise, so that many criteria are
found not to be business justified even though they have considerable predictive power,
this argument is weak. Imprecisions in determining whether a criterion has a disparate
impact may well preclude the use of a criterion with considerable value. This part of our
argument, then, depends heavily on how precise one thinks the business necessity
determination to be. As that determination becomes more precise, less precision in the
disparate impact determination is necessary. A complete justification of the disparate
impact model, then, would require a detailed analysis of the precision of the business
necessity defense. Our focus is elsewhere, however, so we leave that part of the argument
to another day.
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ultimate responsibility, but instead on removing the barrier regardless
of ultimate responsibility.70
The anti-barrier role for the disparate impact model, although
more modest than the two principal rationales for discrimination laws
generally, can be roughly aligned with either. The anti-barrier role
can be viewed as one articulation of the meaning of equal treatment.
Equal treatment in the workplace means to treat equally productive
people without regard to criteria that screen out one race dispropor-
tionately. Ironically, this articulation of equal treatment requires the
central feature of equal treatment as it is traditionally articulated-to
"ignore" race-to be violated. Anti-barrier equal treatment requires
attention to the racial effect of non-productivity-related criteria.
Similarly, the anti-barrier role can fit roughly into the equal
achievement rationale. Non-productivity-related barriers probably do
not arise randomly. They are more likely to arise because of the
lingering effects of past discrimination, thoughtlessness that favors
traditional notions of merit, and a variety of other factors that tend
to disfavor the traditionally disadvantaged.' Although these
factors need not be proved, their existence in most cases means that
the disparate impact model overall' will produce results consistent
with the equal achievement rationale.
IV. A LOOK AT THE LENSES: THE APPROPRIATE TREATMENT
OF CONCURRENCE AND STRATIFICATION IN
DISPARATE IMPACT CASES
Our discussion of blindered causation may appear to suggest that
the concurrence and stratification lenses have virtually no role in
disparate impact analysis. This is not the case. On the contrary, the
170. This argument would be particularly strong if the only remedy for a disparate
impact violation were an injunction against use of the criterion. The remedies, however,
are broader than that. Employers may be liable to individuals whom the criterion
adversely affected and for attorney's fees, even though they are only partially responsible
for the adverse impact. Certainly, that allocation of the costs may spawn claims of
unfairness. On the other hand, employers can avoid all liability by refraining from using
such criteria. Moreover, as between the employer and the adversely affected individuals,
it may well be fairer to impose the costs on the employer.
171. See Lamber, supra note 161, at 870; see also supra note 150 (noting that blindered
causation is not concerned with whether the disparate impact is the product of past
discrimination).
172. The anti-barrier role is a better explanation than the equal achievement rationale,
however, precisely because it recognizes that circumstances will arise in which the disparate
impact model will work counter to equal outcomes. See supra Table 4 and accompanying
text.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
goal of removing barriers that disproportionately exclude individuals
who belong to a protected class provides an important role for both
concurrence and stratification. One can construct causation in
disparate impact analysis to remain blindered to many factors, while
at the same time permitting use of the concurrence and stratification
lenses to provide a more unblindered vision when necessary to pursue
the underlying goals of the disparate impact model.
As suggested in Part II, numerous disparate impact possibilities
arise upon application of concurrence and stratification. We now
consider these situations, develop taxonomies for managing them, and
discuss the appropriate legal treatment of disparate impacts that seem
to appear or disappear as the lenses are applied. At all times, the
anti-barrier role of the disparate impact model, coupled with the
trade-off between efficiency and precision, will inform our legal
analysis.
A. Legal Analysis of Concurrence Situations
1. Current Legal Interpretation
In any disparate impact analysis, in order to show causation, the
plaintiff must first identify the particular employment practice or
selection mechanism at issue.173 Whether or not multiple practices
or mechanisms can constitute a "particular" practice or mechanism for
this purpose directly reaches the concurrence issue. Title VII, as
amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, provides that if plaintiffs
cannot isolate a particular factor in their disparate impact analysis,
multiple components may be treated as one practice or mechanism as
long as the plaintiffs can prove that the multiple components are not
"capable of separation for analysis."' 4 Thus, Title VII presently
anticipates situations in which the plaintiff may establish a prima facie
case through a concurrence argument.
The current legal rule is hardly clear, however; precisely when
components are incapable of separation for analysis is uncertain. An
authoritative interpretive memorandum provides that "[w]hen a
decision-making process includes particular, functionally-integrated
practices which are components of the same criterion, standard,
method of administration, or test, such as the height and weight
173. This is the rule created by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Title VII, §
703(k)(1)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. V 1993).
174. Title VII, § 703(k)(1)(B)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) (Supp. V 1993).
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requirements designed to measure strength in Dothard ... the
particular, functionally-integrated practices may be analyzed as one
employment practice."' 75  Thus, this memorandum authorizes the
use of concurrence by plaintiffs in situations in which the components
are "functionally-integrated," but the characterization of those
situations is not fully delineated.
At one extreme, the memorandum would prevent the absurdity
of having the plaintiff separate each employment-related test item for
disparate impact analysis, because test items are viewed as com-
ponents of the same test. At the other extreme, however, it does not
indicate when the "whole" is so conceptually broad (and hence the
components not sufficiently functionally integrated) that it must be
broken into component parts for disparate impact analysis. For
example, in Dothard v. Rawlinson, the height and weight re-
quirements were used as proxies for strength.'76 The interpretive
memorandum would seem to suggest that because these proxies were
measuring one construct-strength-they may be functionally
integrated for the purpose of showing a disparate impact. However,
the height and weight requirements were certainly capable of being
separated for analysis. The case itself reported statistics on the
impact of each of the two requirements separately, in addition to their
joint impact."7  Further, the fact that they were being used to
measure strength was not apparent until after the plaintiff's prima
facie showing of disparate impact; the strength justification was made
by the employer in an attempt to show job-relatedness.' Thus, the
interpretive memorandum's inclusion of the Dothard example further
muddies the issue of plaintiff's prima facie showing.
A further complication is provided by the provision of the 1991
Act that allows employers to defend against a showing of disparate
impact based on multiple components by demonstrating that a
particular component does not have a disparate impact. 7 9 If the
175. 137 CONG. REc. S15,276 (1991). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides that only
this memorandum (and no other legislative remarks) can be relied on as legislative history
in construing portions of the Act relating to Wards Cove. Civil Rights Act of 1991, §
105(b), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (1991).
176. 433 U.S. 321, 329-31 & n.12 (1977).
177. Id. at 330.
178. Id. at 331-32 & n.14.
179. Title VII, § 703(k)(1)(B)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(ii) (Supp. V 1993). The
employer may also defend by showing business necessity for the multiple components, but
need not show business necessity for any component that can be shown not to have a
disparate impact.
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plaintiff has established a prima facie case by showing an impact for
components that are not capable of separation for analysis, how can
an employer possibly defend by showing that a particular component
does not have a disparate impact?"8  Perhaps the notions of
"functionally integrated" and not "capable of separation for analysis"
are intended to be distinct, in which case the employer may be able
to defend against functionally integrated practices by showing that one
or more of them does not give rise to a disparate impact. However,
this interpretation of "functionally integrated" would appear to
undermine the very purpose of the exception, namely, to prevent
reductio ad absurdum.
2. Proposed Legal Framework
When an employer uses interdependent components to establish
applicant or employee qualification, analysis of each component
individually may not give an accurate picture of whether an adverse
impact exists.'8' For example, although individual components may
not appear to produce a disparate impact on members of a protected
class, when considered concurrently those same components may
produce such an impact. The model's focus on removing barriers for
individuals suggests, and possibly requires, that the employer's joint
or concurrent use of those components be examined. Thus, when
employers use multiple components as part of the selection process,
the joint effect or concurrence of those components leads to a
potentially more complex factual inquiry.
The number of possibilities generated by considering an
employer's multiple components both individually and concurrently
can be staggering. However, for purposes of legal analysis, we can
simplify the taxonomy of types of cases. For example, when the
employer uses two components or criteria, the concurrence lens
generates six relevant possibilities, as illustrated in Table 13."8
180. One possibility could be that the employer has superior information, but given
liberal discovery rules, this possibility seems unlikely.
If components are capable of separation for analysis, the legal issue regarding who
bears the burden of separating them still remains. Title VII is not consistent on this point.
The employer defense discussed at this point in the text places the burden of separation
on the employer-defendant, § 703(k)(1)(B)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(ii) (Supp. V
1993), but Title VII's preceding subsection places the burden of separation on the plaintiff,
§ 703(k)(1)(B)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) (Supp. V 1993).
181. See supra part II.A.
182. If the employer uses more than two components jointly, the same six possibilities
can be generated as fitting our legal rule. This can be seen as follows. First, the same two
columns would apply-all components together either produce a joint impact, or they do
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TABLE 13: BREAKDOWN OF CONCURRENCE POSSIBILITIES
Joint Impact No Joint Impact
Each component alone
has an impact 1 2
One component alone has
an impact, other does not 3 4
Neither component alone
has an impact 5 6
Cells 2 and 4 are easy to consider,' 83 because the only possible
claims available to the plaintiff are the "ordinary" disparate impact
claims-i.e., available data indicate that one or both of the com-
ponents, considered individually, have an impact on the plaintiff's
protected group. The concurrence of the two components produces
no impact. For these two situations, the plaintiff should be able to
establish a prima facie case of disparate impact based on either of the
problematic components. In other words, the individual components
are the specific employment practices that give rise to the disparate
impact.
Further, once the plaintiff has established the prima facie case, the
employer can defend only by proving business necessity for each
individual component."8  The employer should not be able to
defend on the grounds that there is no concurrent or joint impact,
because to do so would violate the "bottom line" prohibition
articulated in Connecticut v. Teal. 85 Under the broader reading of
not. Second, the rows can be defined similarly, because we can consider as analogous
three possibilities: either each component alone will have an impact (row 1), or some
subset of the components will have an impact (individually or individually and collectively)
but others will not (row 2), or none of the components alone will have an impact (row 3).
183. Actually, cell 6 is the easiest cell to consider. Because the components produce
no impact, either individually or concurrently, no prima facie case may be established. We
therefore do not consider this cell further.
184. The employer's defense would be the same as in an "ordinary" disparate impact
case. Each challenged component separately produces an impact, so each challenged
component separately should be business justified.
185. 457 U.S. 440, 442 (1982).
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"bottom line,"186 individual claimants are deprived of opportunities by
the individual components that result in a disparate impact, even if as
a class, there is no disparate impact for the components being used
together." In cell 4, this is particularly clear: If the employer were
to remove the one component causing the impact, the individual
plaintiffs would suffer no disadvantage. Thus, the employer should
have to business justify the impact-producing component in order to
continue using it. In cell 2, removal of either component alone would
not remove the disparate impact that the individual plaintiffs suffered;
both components would need to be removed to alleviate the impact.
In order to keep either of them, the employer should have to prove
business necessity. 8
Cells 1 and 3 raise the possibility of multiple claims by plaintiffs,
because for each of these cells, at least one component individually
produces an impact, and the concurrence of the two components also
produces an impact."8 9 In other words, plaintiffs could in theory
challenge a component in two different capacities-the component as
used alone, and the component as used as part of a set (concurrence)
that produces a joint impact."l We believe that plaintiffs should be
restricted to challenges based on the components individually in such
cases. The rationale is three-fold. First, plaintiffs are not deprived of
a lawsuit by failing to allow claims based on concurrence. By
assumption, cells 1 and 3 represent situations in which at least one of
the components individually gives rise to a disparate impact, so a
possible claim always exists in these cells."9 Therefore, the anti-
barrier goal of the disparate impact model remains intact. Second, it
186. See supra part II.C.l.a.
187. The anti-barrier aspect of the model also supports this point. See supra part III.C.
188. That is, the employer should have to prove business necessity for each component
individually that is demonstrated to have a disparate impact.
189. As the number of components increases, the number of possible claims also
increases. For example, suppose an employer used three components as part of the
selection process. In Cell 1 alone there would be three individual claims possible, one
possible claim involving all three components concurrently, and a variety of possible claims
based on combinations of these four claims and/or other potential claims arising from pairs
of the components that may produce an impact.
190. For situations involving more than two components, the plaintiff would have
possible challenges based on more than one concurrence. That is, not only might all three
components together produce a disparate impact, but pairs of components could also lead
to a showing of disparate impact.
191. Although a claim always exists, a legal rule that refuses to recognize joint effects
in these circumstances does limit claims. Persons who are adversely affected by the joint
effects of the components, but who are not adversely affected by the individual component
with a disparate impact would not have a right to relief under this proposed rule.
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would be difficult to conceive of the components in cells 1 and 3 as
not being "capable of separation for analysis,"192 because it is not
necessary to consider the components together in order to determine
that some impact exists on a protected class. Thus, the statutory
exception granted to plaintiffs in such a situation need not be
invoked. Finally, the alternative rule could give rise to a large
number of possible challenges, and it would be impractical to expect
employers to defend against all of them, or for courts to be able to
consider all of them.93 The efficiency/precision trade-off contained
within the model would be upset to produce more precision at the
expense of great inefficiency.
Because plaintiffs would be allowed to challenge only individual
components in cells 1 and 3, and because they would have to establish
a prima facie case of disparate impact for each challenged component
separately, the employer's defense should be to prove business
necessity for each component that is successfully challenged.9
Cell 5 is the most problematic cell under current disparate impact
law, because it is the cell that we believe must produce a cognizable
claim based on concurrence. In this cell, although neither component
alone produces a disparate impact on the plaintiff's protected class,
the joint effect of the two components serves disproportionately to
exclude members of the plaintiff class.'95 Because the components,
when considered individually, do not produce a disparate impact,
plaintiffs will not be able to establish a prima facie case unless they
can rely on a concurrence argument. It is only the employer's
concurrent use of the components for selection purposes that
produces the impact.
192. Title VII, § 703(k)(1)(B)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 20Oe-2(k)(1)(B)(i) (Supp. V 1993).
193. To illustrate, consider cell 3, an employer that uses one employment criterion that
produces a disparate impact. If joint effects claims were recognized, plaintiffs would be
able to evaluate every other criterion (and every possible combination of criteria) for joint
effects. Criteria that may be completely neutral in effect by themselves may have a joint
impact because of the power of the impact caused by the problematic criterion. Each joint
impact uncovered would expand the scope of the employer's liability. See supra notes 189-
90.
194. Once again, the employer's defense is the same as in "ordinary" disparate impact
cases. See supra note 184.
195. See supra Tables 1-3 in part II.A. If more than two criteria were operating, we
would also allow concurrent challenges for the same reasons discussed in the text. Cell
5 always describes situations where no component on its own can be challenged, so
plaintiffs' only opportunity to eliminate barriers is to challenge joint applications of the
components.
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In this situation, the concurrence of the employer's selection
criteria should be viewed as the particular employment mechanism
that causes the disparate impact.'96 The anti-barrier goal would be
thwarted were plaintiffs denied this opportunity. Additionally,
because this causation cannot be revealed on a component-by-
component basis, the components should not be viewed as "capable
of separation for analysis" -- the deleterious effect of the com-
ponents cannot be assessed unless they are considered together.
Thus, cell 5 falls within the statutory exception.
This legal rule suggests one meaning of not "capable of separation
for analysis" for purposes of Title VII: As long as data are available
about the concurrence of multiple components, and those data suggest
that a disparate impact exists when the components are considered
together but not when they are considered alone, the components
would be viewed as not being "capable of separation for analysis." '98
196. It is the employer's joint use of the criteria that screens out protected class
members disproportionately. This is the standard for causation as established in ordinary
disparate impact cases. See supra part III.A.
197. Title VII, § 703(k)(1)(B)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 20Ooe-2(k)(1)(B)(i) (Supp. V 1993).
198. Another, more intuitive, meaning would be that data are not available on the
individual components, so that it is impossible to measure the presence or absence of an
impact unless the components are considered together. Thus, unavailability of individual
component data is sufficient to establish that components cannot be separated for analysis.
The meaning under our legal rule indicates that unavailability of individual component
data is not necessary to a determination of whether components can be separated for
analysis.
The full legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 indicates that Congress
intended the "capable of separation for analysis" language to cover both situations:
If the requisite information is not reasonably available, it is entirely appropriate
that complaints be able to challenge a group of practices that combine to produce
one or more decisions with respect to employment. For example, in some
instances a complaining party may know that a group of practices together have
a disparate impact, but may not know which practice or practices caused that
impact. In other instances, the complaining party may have adequate information
as to the effect of each practice, but the disparate impact results only when a
number of practices are considered as a group because no single practice results
in a statistically significant exclusion. In both situations, part 703(k)(1)(B)(i)
permits complainants to establish an unlawful employment practice by
demonstrating that the employment practices result in a disparate impact as a
group.
H.R. REP. No. 40, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 42 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 580.
The extent to which this legislative history can be relied upon to interpret the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 is limited, however, because of Congress's attempt to restrict the
available sources of legislative history. See supra note 175.
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Further, this should be true regardless of whether the components
could be considered to be "functionally integrated."'99
Employers should be able to defend in a cell 5 situation by
proving business necessity for the particular employment practice
causing the impact-i.e., the concurrence of the two components used
to determine qualification. This should require more than business
justification of each component alone, because it is not the sole use
of any one component that produces the impact. ]It should instead
require business justification for the use of the components together.
The anti-barrier goal of the disparate impact model makes clear that
this is the required defense: Proof of business necessity for each
component individually could allow employers to use virtually
redundant selection criteria at the expense of individual plaintiffs.2'
Further, employers should not be able to defend in a cell 6
situation by demonstrating the absence of a disproportionate impact
when each component is considered separately. The employer is not
using the components separately, but is imposing them together upon
the plaintiff's protected class. The disparate impact model is not
blindered to the employer's role in producing an impact; it is blind to
199. Whether components are functionally integrated would appear to be more a
conceptual determination than a statistical determination. Thus, height and weight are
functionally related because they conceptually relate to strength; test items are functionally
related because they constitute a test. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
Our determination of separability for analysis is not based on an existing conceptual
relationship, per se. For example, education and experience requirements may not be
viewed as conceptually related. Yet, if they produce an impact together, but not
individually, we consider them to be incapable of separation for the purpose of analysis.
200. The criteria would be redundant in the sense that the second criterion added to
the first does not increase overall usefulness of the selection process to the employer. For
example, suppose a five-year experience requirement and a high school diploma
requirement together produce a disparate impact on African-Americans, but individually
neither produces such an impact. It could be that after requiring a minimum of five years
of experience, the additional requirement of a high school diploma would add little to the
employer's ability to predict success on the job. Either requirement by itself, however,
may be business justified. The employer might prefer to use the combination of
requirements for the slight improvement in prediction. The slight improvement from
adding the education requirement would cause individual plaintiffs to be excluded even
though the addition of the education requirement may not significantly improve the
employer's selection process. Because that slight improvement comes at the cost of
producing a disparate impact that excludes African-Americans, the employer should not
be allowed the luxury of using the criteria together, unless the employer can prove that
the improvement is substantial enough to meet business necessity.
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causes external to the employer.0 1 Thus, such an employer defense
would not address the barrier caused by the employer.
Title VII, however, contains a provision that allows employers to
defend against a showing of disparate impact based on multiple
components by demonstrating that a particular employment practice
does not have a disparate impact.' Both the concurrence lens and
the fundamental purpose of the disparate impact model demonstrate
that the Title VII defense is inappropriate. Individual components
may not produce an impact even though their joint application does.
The exclusion of persons through the joint or concurrent use of
selection criteria is a very real exclusion, even if the exclusion does
not result from the components in their separate, one-by-one
application. Employers should not be permitted any defense that
ignores the exclusion of individuals that has been caused by such
concurrent use of selection criteria.
In summary, our legal framework arising from consideration of
the concurrence lens maintains the existing disparate impact scheme
while introducing one new situation in which plaintiffs should be
permitted to establish a prima facie case-namely, when criteria
considered together produce a disparate impact even though their
separate application does not. Further, this situation produces a new
dimension to the business necessity defense. To justify the joint or
201. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text. Some blindering occurs with regard
to the employer's activities. We have noted that the model is blindered to the net effects
of a component as actually applied in the workplace when that component, considered
alone, produces an impact. That is not the situation we describe here, however. Here, the
joint use of the components produces an impact. The parallel blindering would prohibit
looking at the components on a one-by-one basis to try to argue that, individually, there
was no effect.
202. Title VII, § 703(k)(1)(B)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(ii) (Supp. V 1993). This
section actually refers to a "specific" employment practice, which is arguably distin-
guishable from the "particular" employment practice language used in § 703(k)(1)(B)(i).
We could then interpret the Title VII defense as consistent with our scheme by arguing
that the use of the word "specific" in § 703(k)(1)(B)(ii) was intended to refer to multiple
component situations, which are to be treated as "one employment practice."
§ 703(k)(1)(B)(i). Thus, the employer defenses would be either to refute plaintiffs'
showing of a disparate impact, or to prove business necessity for the concurrent use of the
multiple components. The distinction between "specific" and "particular" employment
practices seems rather strained, however. Additionally, Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), which articulated the requirement that plaintiffs isolate the
precise mechanism that causes the disparate impact, seemed to use both terms interchan-
geably in setting the standard: "As a general matter, a plaintiff must demonstrate that it
is the application of a specific or particular employment practice that has created the
disparate impact under attack." Id. at 657 (emphasis added). It is not likely that the
statutory provision can be read as contradictory to this language in Wards Cove.
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concurrent application of criteria that produce a disparate impact,
employers must demonstrate substantial improvement in the ability
to predict performance arising from the concurrent use. The statutory
defense afforded by Title VII is inconsistent with the blindered
causation principle underlying disparate impact theory.
B. Legal Analysis of Stratification Situations
1. Canvassing the Possibilities
In disparate impact cases, plaintiffs must prove that an
employment practice causes a disparate impact on a protected group.
Stratification promises to improve the precision of that determination.
But stratification also reduces efficiency because it increases the
number and type of possible ways in which causation can be proved
(or disproved) and, hence, the complexity of analysis at this stage of
a disparate impact case. In this section, we will describe the
stratification possibilities. We shall discuss the legal implications of
these possibilities in the following two sections.
Causation is currently established by presenting evidence of a
disparate impact at the aggregate level. Consider again our examples
from Part II.B. To determine whether the employment-related test
causes a cognizable disparate impact, 3 the proportion of all female
test-takers who pass the test is compared to the proportion of all male
test-takers who pass the test. Under this aggregate approach, only
two results are possible: Either the employment practice produces a
cognizable disparate impact or it does not. Thus, under the current
practice, analysis of the causation element would end at either Box 2
or Box 3 of Figure 1.
203. To be cognizable, the disparate impact would have to reach a level that is legally
significant. Once again, the four-fifths rule is the most common articulation of the level
of legal significance. See supra note 22.
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FIGURE 1: STRATIFICATION POSSIBILITIES
Aggregate
Level:
Stratified
Levels:
Recognizing stratification as an appropriate analytical technique
increases the number of possibilities. It may be that the relationship
between sex and test result in our example has been influenced by the
educational level of the test-takers. Stratifying the population of test-
takers by educational level and then looking again at the relationship
between sex and test-result may provide us with a different view of
the relationship. But stratification increases the number of possible
outcomes. For each of the two possibilities under the aggregate
approach, stratification makes it possible that the result was obtained
because of confounding effects (Boxes 4 and 7), because of interacting
effects (Boxes 5 and 8), or in the absence of either confounding or
interacting effects (Boxes 6 and 9).2'
204. We have presented only some of the possible situations in our examples in part
II.B. We now canvass all possibilities.
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Stratification in some cases may not be appropriate, for either
statistical reasons or legal reasons.' °5 In such a situation, we are in
either Box 6 or 9: We have an aggregate result of either a disparate
impact (Box 2) or no disparate impact (Box 3) and a determination
that stratification is not appropriate. No further statistical analysis is
required.
In other cases, stratification is appropriate. Two general
possibilities exist here. The stratifying variable can either confound
the relationship between test and sex or it can moderate the relation-
ship! 6
When an interaction is present (Boxes 5 and 8), the direction of
the relationship between sex and test result change, depending on the
level of the stratifying variable.' In Table 7 of Part II.B, for
example, education was a two-level stratifying variable. For non-
college graduates, women did better than men on the tests; for college
graduates, men did better than women. The relationship between sex
and test changed, depending on the level (college graduate or not) of
the stratifying variable. This example would fit into Box 5-a
disparate impact existed at the aggregate level, but an interaction
effect appeared after stratification. Box 8 covers situations in which
no disparate impact exists at the aggregate level, but an interaction
effect appears after stratification.2 °" An interaction effect means
that different levels of the stratifying variable have contradictory
outcomes regarding their impacts on the protected class. In these
situations, it is not meaningful to pool across the stratifying levels to
determine an overall relationship between the two variables of
interest (such as sex and test result in the Table 7 example).
The other possible result when stratification is appropriate is that
the stratifying variable has a confounding effect on the relationship of
interest. This means that a relationship between the variables of
interest (sex and test result) exists at every level of the stratifying
205. We discuss these reasons in subparts IV.B.2. and IV.B.3., infra.
206. Recall that a moderating relationship is the same thing as an interaction. See
supra note 36 and accompanying text.
207. As mentioned previously, see supra note 36, when an interaction exists, it is always
in addition to a confounding effect. Thus, from a statistical viewpoint, it makes sense to
first determine whether an interaction exists. If so, then confounding must also exist; if
not, then a separate determination is made as to confounding. For these reasons, we first
discuss the interaction situation.
208. For example, when stratified, men would be favored within one level of education,
women would be favored within the other, but when aggregated together, ignoring
education, no impact occurs.
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variable (educational level) and in the same direction, but that the
magnitude of the relationship varies depending on the level of the
stratifying variable. This can be seen in our Table 6 example in Part
II.B, where the male pass rate on the test was higher than the female
pass rate for both college graduates and non-college graduates, but
the difference in male-female pass rates was greater for college
graduates than for non-college graduates. When a stratifying variable
has a confounding effect, the results from each level of stratification
can be pooled to produce a measure of the overall relationship
between the two variables of interest (sex and test result).29 Thus,
if a disparate impact exists in the aggregate (Box 2) and a stratifying
variable produces a confounding effect (Box 4), a disparate impact
may also exist when the levels are pooled (Box 10), or it may not
(Box 11). Similarly, if no disparate impact exists in the aggregate
(Box 3) and a stratifying variable produces a confounding effect (Box
7), a disparate impact may or may not exist when the levels are
pooled (Boxes 12 and 13).
A disparate impact has traditionally been proved by presenting
evidence at the aggregate level only. Under this approach, only two
possible outcomes are possible-either a disparate impact exists or it
does not (Boxes 2 and 3). Recognizing stratification as a technique
for evaluating impact increases the number of possible outcomes to
eight (Boxes 5, 6, and 8 through 13). The next two sections will
discuss the legal and statistical issues presented by each of these
outcomes, keeping in mind the key characteristics of blindered
causation for the disparate impact model.
2. Causation When Stratification Is Used Defensively
Two basic stratification situations exist. In the first, a disparate
impact exists at the aggregate level and the employer attempts to
defend210 by stratifying (Figure 1, Boxes 4, 5, 6, 10, 11). In the.
second, no disparate impact exists at the aggregate level and the
plaintiff attempts to present a prima facie case by stratifying (Figure
1, Boxes 7, 8, 9, 12, 13). We discuss the first situation in this section
and the second in the next section.
To illustrate the first type of situation, let us return to our original
example: An employer uses a test as a selection device. Assume, as
209. This does not eliminate the stratifying variable; instead, it explicitly accounts for
it by computing results within each of its levels and pooling the results across the levels.
210. We use the language "the employer attempts to defend" purposefully. See infra
notes 211-14 and accompanying text.
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we did before, that the test has a disparate impact against women at
the aggregate level. The employer is attempting to defend against this
prima facie case by stratifying-by dividing the test-takers into those
who are and are not college graduates.
First, a preliminary point on burdens of proof is in order. In
normal disparate impact cases, the plaintiff bears the burden of
proving a disparate impact by a preponderance of the evidence and,
if the employee meets that burden, the burden of production and
persuasion shifts to the employer to prove business necessity by a
preponderance of the evidence.2 ' Stratification cases arise in the
space between those two points. The plaintiff has met its burden of
proving a disparate impact at the aggregate level 12 and the
employer defends, not by attempting to prove business necessity, but
by attempting to undermine through stratification the demonstration
of a disparate impact. For several reasons, the employer should bear
the burdens of production and persuasion at this stage. First, ordinary
cases have always permitted plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case
based on aggregate statistics. Imposing a burden on plaintiffs to
counter stratification possibilities would increase the burdens in
disparate impact cases as they have traditionally been understood, and
would produce large inefficiencies. Second, defendants are more
likely to have ready access to the types of information necessary to
engage in stratification.213 Third, the types of restrictions that
should be placed on the availability of stratification as a defense (for
example, that the stratifying variable is justified by business neces-
211. Title VII, §§ 701(m), 703(k)(1)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(n), 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i)
(Supp. V 1993).
212. More specifically, in this type of stratification case, the plaintiff bears the initial
burden of production and persuasion to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the
existence of a disparate impact at the aggregate level.
213. The Supreme Court has been relatively dismissive of this type of argument because
of the liberality of discovery rules. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642,
657-58 (1989); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981).
But here efficiency reasons are present to impose this burden on employers even with
liberal discovery rules. If the burden were on plaintiffs to counter stratification
possibilities, plaintiffs in every case would have to discover from employers all information
possibly relevant to stratification to meet their burden of disproving stratification
possibilities. Employers then would have to compile the information. With the burden
on employers, on the other hand, employers can assess the cost of accessing the necessary
data. The employer may decide in some cases that the cost of accessing the data exceeds
the likely benefits of the data. Similarly, the employer could focus on the stratification
possibilities that are most likely to be successful and expend its defense resources on those
alone, rather than on all possibilities.
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sity)214 align with other defenses for which the employer already
bears the burden of proof.
Four possibilities exist after stratification: (1) a confounding
effect is present, but a disparate impact exists after the stratifying
levels are pooled (Box 10); (2) a confounding effect is present and no
disparate impact exists after the stratifying levels are pooled (Box 11);
(3) an interaction effect is present (Box 5); or (4) no confounding or
interaction effect is present (Box 6).
Two of these possibilities require only brief discussion. The Box
10 situation does not present any new problems because a disparate
impact exists at both the aggregate and stratified levels.215 The
employer could not rely on stratification as a defense in this situation
and the case would proceed in the same way as an ordinary case
based on aggregate data; that is, the burden would shift to the
employer to defend by proving that the test is business justified.
Similarly, the Box 6 situation is relatively easy. In this box, one of
two things has happened; either (1) stratification is statistically
inappropriate so no legitimate confounding or interacting effects can
be observed, or (2) stratification is appropriate, but the stratifying
variables do not present confounding or interacting effects. In either
event, the employer will be unable to make out a stratification
defense and, as a result, the plaintiff's initial showing of a disparate
impact at the aggregate level should stand. Once again, the case
should be treated the same as an ordinary disparate impact case; the
employer can defend successfully only by proving business neces-
sity.216
Two possibilities remain; both present more difficult problems.
Let us consider Box 11 first-stratification produces a confounding
effect and no disparate impact exists after the stratified levels are
appropriately pooled. In our original example in Part II.B, the test
produced a disparate impact at the aggregate level, but no disparate
214. See infra notes 220-22 and accompanying text.
215. Recall that when confounding effects are present, pooling the levels for analysis,
rather than treating the stratified levels separately, is statistically appropriate. See supra
note 28.
216. The first possibility here-that stratification was not appropriate-is important.
Typically this means that stratification reduces the power of the statistical testing
procedure so that confounding or interaction effects cannot be determined. For a
discussion of statistical power, see e.g., JACOB COHEN, STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS
FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (2d ed. 1988); Jacob Cohen, A Power Primer, 112
PSYCHOL. BULL. 155 (1992); Richard Goldstein, Two Types of Statistical Errors in
Employment Discrimination Cases, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 32 (1985).
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impact existed at either of the stratified levels (college graduates and
non-college graduates) or when the stratified levels were appropriately
pooled.
To reach a first approximation of the proper resolution in this
situation, consider how this fits into the disparate impact framework
developed for ordinary cases. The employer's attempt to defend
against the disparate impact at the aggregate level in this situation can
be analogized to a situation in which the employer attempts to defend
by relying on causative factors external to the employer. In our
example, the employer's evidence demonstrates that the disparate
impact is not caused by its use of the test alone, but by the test and
the underlying social factors (here, educational level) that interact
with the test to produce the disparate impact. In ordinary cases,
evidence of contributing causal factors external to the employer is ir-
relevant.217 As a first approximation, stratification evidence should
receive the same treatment. That is, evidence of social factors
contributing to the disparate impact of the test in our example should
receive the same treatment as evidence of social factors contributing
to the disparate impact of the high school diploma requirement in
Griggs: Both are irrelevant.218
Stratification, however, can be viewed not only as an attempt to
explain a disparate impact based on external social factors, but also
as an attempt to demonstrate that the test requirement does not
produce any actual adverse impact in the particular workplace.
Instead of arguing that it is not responsible for an impact caused by
external factors, the employer would be arguing that no impact exists
within its workplace. At first glance, this argument might seem to beprohibited by yet another blinder-the blinder that prohibits an
examination of the "net effect" of one criterion in the workplace.1 9
Notice, however, that the employer would not be arguing that there
is no net effect of the test requirement due to other requirements
used in the workplace. The stratifying variable (education) is not an
employer requirement, by assumption. Thus, the employer's
argument falls somewhere between "external causes" and "net
effects," and blindered causation does not rule out the employer's
217. See supra part III.A. This would be the situation in Tables 5 and 6, see supra part
II.B, if pooling in Table 6 did not produce a disparate impact.
218. The analogy suggests, then, that the same reasons supporting blindered treatment
of causation in ordinary cases support blindered treatment of causation in stratification
situations. See supra part III.A.
219. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
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attempted defense. In fact, stratification can be seen as increasing the
precision used to determine whether an impact exists. If no adverse
impact exists, obviously, no disparate impact liability should attach.
The proper view depends on how closely the stratifying variable
relates to the particular workplace. If the stratifying variable is
tangential to the particular workplace, it is analogous to a social factor
and, therefore, should be ignored. The employer should be liable for
the aggregate disparate impact. On the other hand, if the stratifying
variable is a factor closely related to legitimate employer interests in
the particular workplace, the employer has demonstrated that no
cognizable disparate impact exists. In this situation, the finding of no
disparate impact in Box 11 should result in no employer liability.
The existing business necessity standard supplies ready-made
criteria for distinguishing between these two situations. If the
stratifying variable is justified by business necessity, it can operate to
limit liability; if it is not justified by business necessity, it should be
ignored. Using the business necessity standard for making the
distinction has several advantages:" The standard is the one
generally applied when employers attempt to defend against an
aggregate disparate impact, it focuses on the proper relationship (the
relationship between the stratifying variable and ability to do the
job),"21 and it comes with a wealth of case law defining its
parameters.2'
This standard imposes fairly stringent limits on the ability of
employers to use stratification defensively. Stratification could be
used defensively only if an employer could convince the factfinder
that it was necessary to distinguish between employees based on the
stratifying variable, even though the employer did not do so directly.
The standard would also make it impossible for an employer to
220. Having some standard is necessary. In the absence of a standard, employers could
engage in a free-wheeling search for stratifying variables that might explain an aggregate
disparity, regardless of their contextual implausibility. Astrological sign as a stratifying
variable, for example, might explain away an aggregate disparate impact in some
circumstances, despite its implausibility as a relevant factor. A standard is necessary to
constrain the scope of the search for explanatory stratifying variables.
221. Note that this relationship is different than the relationship examined by the
"reasonable relationship to the test" criterion, discussed below. See infra note 226. Here
the relevant relationship is between the stratifying variable and ability to perform the job;
there the relevant relationship is between the primary and stratifying variables.
222. Any other standard would require a number of cases to define its parameters. The
business necessity standard, although by no means precise, has been defined by a number
of cases and is a familiar concept to the courts. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440,
451 (1982); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
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defend successfully by stratifying based on time ' unless it was
known why time tended to ameliorate the aggregate disparate impact.
In summary, an employer can always defend against an aggregate
disparate impact by proving that the primary variable (the test in our
example) is business justified. This is a complete defense; the
employer can continue to use the primary variable and is not liable
at all. In addition, the employer can defend by demonstrating that
stratification is appropriate, 4 produces Box 11 results, and that the
stratifying variable is business justified.
These same basic principles should apply in the remaining
situation, Box 5. Here stratification uncovers an interaction effect.
For example, the aggregate disparate impact based on a test could be
produced by a strong disparate impact against female non-college
graduates, with no disparate impact against female college graduates.
Once again, the employer, as always, can defend by proving that
business necessity justifies the primary variable. In Box 5, the
employer can also defend by demonstrating that stratification is
appropriate and produces an interaction effect, and that the stratifying
variable is justified by business necessity. In contrast to Box 11, in
Box 5 such a showing would not save the primary variable. The
employer would still be enjoined from continuing to use the test. The
showing would, however, limit the employer's liability to individual
class members. Relief would be limited to those who were in the
disfavored subgroup-in our example, to those who failed the test and
were non-college graduates. Female college graduates would not be
entitled to relief even if they failed the test, because the test did not
cause that subgroup of women to suffer a disparate impact.
3. Causation When Stratification Is Used Offensively
Stratification can also be used offensively. If no disparate impact
exists at the aggregate level, plaintiffs may stratify in an attempt to
223. A test used by an employer, for example, may have a disparate impact in the
aggregate, but may not have a disparate impact if the test-takers are stratified by time
(e.g., test-takers who took the test in 1992 versus those who took the test in 1993). Under
the standard we propose, however, the employer would not be able to defend in this way
unless the employer could demonstrate that the stratifying variable is "job related for the
position in question and consistent with business necessity." Title VII, § 703(k)(1)(A)(i),
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. V 1993). Time by itself can never meet that
standard. To defend successfully, the employer would have to demonstrate how the test-
takers in the two time periods differed (perhaps one set had better educational credentials)
and then demonstrate that that criterion was business justified.
224. See supra note 216.
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prove a disparate impact. Four basic possibilities exist when
stratification is used offensively: (1) a confounding effect is present
and a disparate impact exists after pooling the stratifying levels (Box
12); (2) a confounding effect is present and no disparate impact exists
after pooling the stratifying levels (Box 13); (3) an interaction effect
is present (Box 8); or (4) no confounding or interaction effect is
present (Box 9). These possibilities mirror those present when
stratification is used defensively.
Boxes 13 and 9 do not present plaintiffs with any new oppor-
tunities to establish a disparate impact. In Box 13, stratification
produced a confounding effect, but no disparate impact was present
after pooling. The plaintiff's position has not changed from Box 3
(the aggregate result)-plaintiff has not demonstrated a disparate
impact. In Box 9, either stratification is not appropriate or it has not
produced a confounding or interacting effect. Once again, plaintiff's
position is the same as it was in Box 3. Plaintiff's case fails because
she has not demonstrated a disparate impact.
Plaintiffs can use stratification offensively in Boxes 12 and 8.
Consider Box 12 first, in light of our continuing example. The
employer uses a test that does not have a disparate impact against
women in the aggregate (Box 3). Educational level, however, has a
confounding effect and when the stratifying levels are pooled, a
disparate impact against women exists (Box 12). The anti-barrier goal
requires that plaintiffs be allowed to establish such a claim. To reach
this point, plaintiffs would have to prove that stratification is
statistically appropriate and that the stratifying variable bears a
reasonable relationship to the primary variable.2 6  Assuming the
plaintiff can meet these burdens, plaintiff has established a prima facie
disparate impact case.
The burden would then shift to the employer to demonstrate that
business necessity justifies either the primary variable or the stratifying
225. See supra part IV.B.2.
226. This standard fills the same role as the business necessity standard when
stratification is used defensively-it limits the ability to engage in a free-wheeling search
for stratifying variables that might produce a pooled disparate impact, regardless of their
contextual implausibility. See supra note 220. It thus maintains a balance between
precision and efficiency in the model. This standard, however, focuses on a different
relationship. The "reasonable relationship" standard focuses on the relationship between
the stratifying and primary variables. A test and educational level would bear a
reasonable relationship to each other; a test and astrological sign would not. The business
necessity standard focuses on the relationship between those variables and ability to
perform the job.
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variable. Proving that the primary variable is business justified
imposes the same burden on the employer as in ordinary cases. An
employer in this situation, however, can also defend by proving that
the stratifying variable is business justified. Proof of that would mean
that the employer is justified in distinguishing between
employees/applicants based on the stratifying variable and, as a result,
that plaintiffs cannot rely on that variable to establish a prima facie
case. If the employer cannot demonstrate that either the primary or
the stratifying variable is business justified, the plaintiffs have
established a disparate impact violation.
These same principles apply in Box 8. In Box 8, no disparate
impact exists at the aggregate level, but at the stratified level the test
produces a disparate impact against women in one sub-category (e.g.,
non-college graduates) but not women in the other (e.g., college
graduates). The plaintiff should be able to establish a prima facie
case in this category if stratification is appropriate." The employer
can defend by proving that either the primary variable or the
stratifying variable is business justified. If the employer cannot meet
this burden, use of the primary variable should be enjoined, but the
employer should be liable only to the women who suffer the disparate
impact (non-college graduates).
V. CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have viewed the disparate impact model
through two new lenses: concurrence and stratification. The lenses
proved to be extremely powerful. They permitted us to see the model
from a different angle, an angle that highlighted the nature of the
model, the source of its power, and its underlying purpose. The
lenses also proved to be interesting in their own right. The lenses
present a host of difficult factual situations that the courts have barely
begun to address. We have described those situations and suggested
how they ought to be resolved.
At the same time, our discussion has raised at least three new
questions that we have not had space (or energy) to address fully
here.' First, our suggested analyses will require courts to distin-
227. Once again, two factors determine appropriateness: statistical appropriateness and
a reasonable relationship between the primary and stratifying viriables. See supra notes
216 and 226.
228. There are other, more tangential, issues that arise as well. For example, we have
already noted that the relevant population for purposes of disparate impact analysis has
not been thoroughly considered by legal scholars, and may in fact be problematic under
1996]
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guish between concurrence and stratification. We have distinguished
the two by defining concurrence as situations in which an employer
uses more than one employment criterion and defining stratification
as situations in which a factor not explicitly used by the employer is
considered. Although this distinction is easy to state, it will not
always be easy to determine whether an employer "uses" an
employment criterion. Suppose, for example, that an employer
requires applicants to have a high school diploma and, in addition,
often receives applications from applicants who have received word-
of-mouth recommendations from existing employees. The plaintiff
believes that she and members of her protected group are dispropor-
tionately excluded by both factors together, but not by either one
alone. Should she be allowed to claim that this is a concurrence
situation? Or, should she have to use the high school diploma
requirement as the primary criterion and stratify by word-of-mouth
recommendations (applicants who apply because of word-of-mouth
recommendations versus applicants who apply after hearing of the
employer through other methods)? The court must decide whether
the word-of-mouth technique is attributable to the employer to
determine the proper method of analysis. At the margin, the decision
may be difficult.'2 9
Our analysis also raises, but does not consider, the issue of how
to deal with continuous, rather than categorical, variables. For
simplicity, we used only categorical variables in our examples (i.e.,
employees either passed or failed a test, or had or did not have a high
school diploma). But, obviously, concurrence and stratification
situations can arise with respect to continuous variables as well. For
example, an employer may use one categorical variable (pass or fail
a test) and one continuous variable (years of experience) to determine
existing Supreme Court language. See supra note 160 and accompanying text. Our focus
now is on the three unresolved issues that relate directly to the lenses themselves.
229. This type of determination is not unique to concurrence and stratification
situations. If the plaintiff were challenging only the "word-of-mouth" technique for
obtaining potential employees, the court would have to decide if the technique was an
employment practice being used by the employer. See EEOC v. Miniature Lamp Works,
947 F.2d 292, 305 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that company's passive reliance on word-of-
mouth to fill vacancies did not constitute an employment practice); Catlett v. Missouri
Highway & Transp. Comm'n, 587 F. Supp. 929, 946-47 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (finding company
responsible for word-of-mouth recruiting). Increased recognition of concurrence and
stratification, however, may increase the frequency with which courts are faced with such
issues.
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suitability for promotion."IO It is easy to understand conceptually
that the categorical and continuous variables may operate jointly to
produce a disparate impact even though neither does individually in
just the same way that two categorical variables might231 We
avoided consideration of continuous variables because the
mathematical difficulties would have obscured our goal of focusing on
conceptual and policy issues. Nevertheless, that is a relevant topic for
a later day.
Finally, we have not discussed in any detail the statistical
methodologies that are appropriate to identify and assess confounding
and interaction relationships. Fortunately, well-accepted statistical
methodologies exist for analyzing data viewed through the concur-
rence and stratification lenses. Many of these techniques have already
been used, albeit with a slightly different focus, in disparate treatment
cases. 2 Thus, both courts and social scientists are relatively well-
equipped to handle the statistical complexities that will arise through
application of our suggested analyses. Nevertheless, further
elucidation of these methodologies, and especially of their application
in the disparate impact context, is important. Once again, however,
we leave that topic to another day.
230. One could attempt to treat experience as a categorical variable in various ways,
but such attempts may be impossible, impractical, or unrealistic.
231. Similar examples can arise for stratification purposes. We do not consider them
here specifically, because our discussion is an abbreviated one serving only to introduce
the issue.
232. One such technique, the Mantel-Haentzel technique for pooling across levels of
a confounding factor, is discussed in several sources. See, e.g., MICHAEL 0. FINKELSTEIN
& BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS 241-49 (1990); Joseph L. Gastwirth, Statistical
Methods for Analyzing Claims of Employment Discrimination, 38 INDUS. & LAB. REL.
REV. 75 (1984). The most popular set of techniques stem from application of the linear
model. These techniques-popularly referred to as various forms of "regression"
analysis-allow for determination of interaction and/or confounding effects. Regression
analysis has been widely used in disparate treatment cases involving compensation. See,
e.g., JOHN NETER ET AL., APPLIED LINEAR REGRESSION MODELS (1983). A special type
of regression known as logistic regression would be directly applicable to disparate impact
cases. See DAVID W. HOSMER & STANLEY LEMESHOW, APPLIED LOGISTIC REGRESSION
(1989) (containing extensive discussion of the methodology, and how to use it to detect
confounding and interacting effects).

